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REASONING ABOUT THE IRRATIONAL: THE ROBERTS
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
H. Jefferson Powell*
Abstract: Commentary on the future direction of the Roberts Court generally falls along
lines that correlate with the commentators’ political views on the desirability of the Court’s
recent decisions. A more informative approach is to look for opinions suggesting changes in
the presuppositions with which the Justices approach constitutional decision making. In
footnote 27 in his opinion for the Court in the District of Columbia v. Heller Second
Amendment decision, Justice Scalia suggested a fundamental revision of the Court’s
assumptions about the role of judicial doctrine, and the concept of rationality, in
constitutional law. Justice Scalia would eliminate the normative aspects of the Court’s
inquiry into rationality, and reject altogether the generally accepted view that rationality
review is a deliberate underenforcement of a constitutional norm of substantive reasonability,
primarily implemented by the legislature. Footnote 27 cites Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, which adopts a similar view of rationality
as free of normative content. The common threads linking footnote 27, the Engquist opinion,
and a debate between Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald v. City of Chicago this past
June, suggest that footnote 27 is a significant clue to the fundamental understanding of
constitutional law that commands at least a plurality on the current Court. If this
understanding becomes dominant, it will profoundly change the Court’s treatment of
precedent, rational-basis scrutiny, and the role of the political branches in constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
Disagreement over the proper direction of constitutional law is as old
as the Republic. At present, however, it isn’t clear to many which
direction—right or wrong—the United States Supreme Court is taking
constitutional law. On the one hand, the editorial board of the New York
Times spoke for a host of other critics in complaining that “the Roberts
[C]ourt demonstrated its determination to act aggressively to undo
aspects of law it found wanting, no matter the cost.”1 By “the Roberts
[C]ourt,” the editors meant what they described as a five-Justice
“conservative majority [that] made clear that it is not done asserting
itself” on issues of grave national importance,2 perhaps including the
constitutionality of health-care reform. From the perspective of these
commentators, the Roberts Court has “come of age” and “entered an
assertive and sometimes unpredictable phase,” in which (despite the
occasional surprise) the majority Justices are “fearless” in exerting their
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. I wish to
thank Chip Lupu, Sarah Powell, Peter Smith, and James Boyd White, who provided valuable
comments and criticism for which I am grateful.
1. Editorial, The Court’s Aggressive Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2010, at A16. The Times’ editors,
to be sure, grudgingly conceded that it had not been “a thoroughly disappointing term,” but few
readers will have doubted the editors’ fundamental agreement with other, less nuanced critiques of
the Court.
2. Id.
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power to advance the politically conservative (pro-business, pro-gun,
anti-criminal defendant) interests Chief Justice Roberts favors.3 Elena
Kagan’s succession to the seat of retiring Justice John Paul Stevens, on
this view, was at best a holding action against the Court’s complete
takeover by the Right.
On the other hand, the admirers of the Court’s decisions generally
insist that the critics are vastly overstating both the ideological content
of the Court’s judgments and the aggressiveness of the Justices who
usually make up the majority in highly ideological, divided decisions.
This error of analysis was quite deliberate, and the tale of political
takeover was “all such tedious sophistry” by the Left, a dishonest
demonization of Justices whose decisions were marked by caution and
attention to the specific demands of the judicial process.4
The identity of the current Court, on this view, is shaped more by
circumstance than ideology, and by the Justices’ lawyerly approach to its
role. As Jonathan Adler argued, “The Roberts Court is a work in
progress, and the change in Court personnel will introduce new
dynamics, as will a different combination of cases and issues that come
before the Court. . . . [A]t present, we can characterize the Roberts Court
as a moderately conservative minimalist Court . . . .”5
No reader was surprised to notice that critics of an aggressively
ideological Roberts Court are to the left of center in terms of American
politics, or that admirers of a judicially modest majority are equally
likely to occupy positions to the political center’s right. Those are
precisely the positions of criticism or apologetics that one would expect,
given contemporary politics and the contemporary Court. In itself, this
correlation between the politics of commentators and their perceptions
of the Court proves nothing: either the liberal critique or the
conservative apologetics might actually be warranted by the Court’s
actions, even if there are political or sociological explanations for the

3. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court Comes of Age, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/us/30scotus.html (quoting Lisa S. Blatt on the Justices’
fearlessness).
4. See Ann Althouse, “[T]he Roberts Court Demonstrated its Determination to Act Aggressively
to Undo Aspects of Law it Found Wanting, No Matter the Cost.”, ALTHOUSE (July 5, 2010, 10:13
AM), http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/07/roberts-court-demonstrated-its.html.
5. Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2,
2010, 9:58 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-supreme-court/. Like the
Times’ editors, Adler noted that it would be wrong to treat the Court’s decisions as monolithic, in
his case by qualifying his “moderately conservative minimalist” characterization of the majority:
“(except when [it’s] not).”
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views the observers espouse.6 The consistency with which the individual
observer’s analysis tracks his or her political views, however, does
suggest that we are unlikely to make jurisprudential sense of “the
Roberts Court,” or more precisely of the law announced by the Court’s
current working majority in divisive cases, if we let our analyses move
too quickly to the bottom line issues of political, economic, and moral
significance to the Court’s decisions. The outcomes simply matter too
much—to most of us and to the Justices—and the demonstrable
ideological content of the cases is reflected, isomorphically, in the
demonstrable ideological slant of the commentators’ analyses. As a
result, much of what has been said about the Roberts Court has told us a
great deal about the commentators’ political, economic, and moral
commitments—and very little about the Court’s decisions as judgments
of law.7
One response to the emptiness and predictability of so much
purported analysis, enthusiastically endorsed by many political
scientists, is to conclude that there is little or no value to the enterprise of
making jurisprudential sense of the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional
decisions, in this or any other era. The Court is a political actor, the
Justices’ constitutional decisions are exercises of political choice (which
of course need not mean political choice in a crude, partisan sense), and
whatever socially valuable contributions scholars can make by studying
the Court must lie in the various modes of empirical investigation into
the demonstrable sources and ascertainable consequences of the Court’s
decisions. But empirical research, valuable as it is in ascertaining the
Court’s patterns of decision and its impact on the world, cannot displace
entirely normative analysis, at least without a price heavier than perhaps
most of us are willing to pay. The search to make sense of what the
Court actually does, in the light of what the Court ought to do, is
essential to the idea that the Court is actually “doing law” when it
announces constitutional decisions. If we can say nothing about the
Court’s success, or failure, in carrying out the task of constitutional
6. Perhaps the clearest statement of this fundamental truth—that we can recognize the relativity
of all perspectives without that recognition implying in the least that no view is in fact correct—is to
be found in Peter Berger’s classic discussion of religious belief. See PETER L. BERGER, A RUMOR
OF ANGELS 31–53 (1969). We cannot stop to discuss the philosophical issues; the purpose of citing
Berger is solely to reject out of hand any argument that evaluation of the Court can only be an
expression of the evaluator’s prejudices.
7. There is little value in trying to determine whether any individual decision (or decisions) or
Justice (or coalition of Justices) is activist or restrained; there again the conclusions are too
predictable to be enlightening. The problems with “judicial activism” as a meaningful tool of
analysis are well-known, and no purpose would be served by rehearsing them here.
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decision responsibly, as a matter of law, other than to express our
pleasure or dismay at the apparent politics of the Justices, then we have
emptied that task, and constitutional law itself, of any distinctive quality.
Despite the political predictability of most of their work, however, the
Term-end commentators on the Roberts Court—both the critics and the
apologists—were right to look for legal patterns in the work of the
Court. Their analyses ended up generating more heat than light because
the commentators tackled their subject too directly, looking too quickly
at the Roberts Court’s outcomes. Those outcomes sort out along
ideological lines neatly enough that the analysts find it all but impossible
to more than attack or defend the Court along lines essentially, and
demonstrably, political.
What we need is more in the way of indirect analysis, commentary
that looks at the patterns of thought, the assumptions and
preconceptions, that the Justices of the Roberts Court employ. It is in
these jurisprudential patterns of thought that we can hope to ground
evaluations of the Court’s constitutional work that do not simply
replicate our own or the Justices’ political predispositions. This Article
is meant as a modest contribution to this task of making jurisprudential
sense—lawyers’ sense—out of the decisions of the Roberts Court
through the indirect approach of asking not what the Court held in
constitutional cases, but rather how the Justices think about the practice
of constitutional decisionmaking.
In Part I, this Article looks to the Court’s recent decisions District of
Columbia v. Heller8 and McDonald v. City of Chicago9 and finds the
seeds of a new direction in judicial review of legislative and agency
decisionmaking. Specifically, footnote 27 in Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Heller10 and the majority’s treatment of the dissent in
McDonald11 provide evidence that the Roberts Court is moving away

8. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9. 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
10. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, would
pass rational-basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.
In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the
constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which
a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee
against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. If all that was
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have
no effect.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
11. 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3048–50 (discussing Justice Breyer’s arguments in dissent).
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from current constitutional doctrines and towards a less onerous
standard. The thesis of this Article is that the doctrinal vision of
constitutional law, to which footnote 27 is an important clue, has
profound implications for the role of constitutional law in our society. If
the vision encapsulated in footnote 27 supplied the accepted
presuppositions on which lawyers approach constitutional issues, the
results would profoundly affect not only the specific outcomes the U.S.
Supreme Court might reach, but also the overall role of constitutional
law in the life of the Republic.
Parts II and III outline the key features of constitutional law, as
currently practiced, that footnote 27 and Engquist v. Oregon Department
of Agriculture12 imply we should abandon. In Part II, this Article
discusses the role of constitutional doctrine, judicial standards of
scrutiny or modes of analysis that the Court creates in order to
implement constitutional norms without claiming that the standards or
modes of review are themselves identical to those norms. The distinction
between the standard the Court employs and the underlying command
the Court is enforcing gives rise to a “doctrinal gap.” The doctrinal gap
is a central feature of constitutional thought that is also of great practical
importance.
Part III discusses the significance of the doctrinal gap in argument
over the authority of the Court’s constitutional decisions. If a precedent
is understood to rest on a doctrinal basis rather than to involve the direct
application of a constitutional norm, the Court has considerable freedom
to follow the precedent, even if a majority of the Justices are
unsympathetic to it as a matter of constitutional principle. A precedent
that is equated to the content of the norm, in contrast, tends to stand or
fall with the continuing existence of a majority that believes it to be
correct.
Part IV turns to the significance of the doctrinal gap for our
understanding of the roles of the judiciary and the political branches of
government in the enforcement of the Constitution. This Part argues that
the prevalence of the doctrinal gap in constitutional law creates an
intellectual space for political-branch enforcement that recognizes the
priority of the courts’ decisions. This Part then examines the idea of the
doctrinal gap as applied to a famous rational-basis decision, Williamson
v. Lee Optical,13 and thus brings the reader back to the central claim of
footnote 27, that rational-basis scrutiny gives rise to no doctrinal gap

12. 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
13. 348 U.S. 483 (1954).
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because it is a direct application of the constitutional norm it
implements.
Part V suggests that footnote 27’s attack on the doctrinal gap could
lead to profound changes in current constitutional thought and practice,
rendering judicial precedents more brittle and less stable, thereby
undermining the independent role of the political branches in the
implementation of the Constitution.
Part VI examines Justice Scalia’s assertion in footnote 27 that
constitutional commands enforced by rational-basis review “are
themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.”14 Rational-basis review has
traditionally assumed that in constitutional law, “rationality” has
normative content. Rather than merely denoting the absence of blatant
illogic, the requirement of rationality has included a prohibition on
governmental actions that lack an independent, public-focused
justification.15 As Justice Scalia—and Chief Justice Roberts in his
opinion for the Court in Engquist—understand constitutional rationality,
this normative dimension vanishes, and the constitutional rule becomes a
simple ban on purposeless or self-contradictory actions.16
Finally, Part VII reflects on how footnote 27, and the constitutional
vision it embodies, fit into contemporary debate, and what they may say
about the future of constitutional law in the era of the Roberts Court.
I.

MCDONALD AND HELLER SIGNAL A NEW DIRECTION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND AGENCY
DECISIONMAKING

Following what has become tradition, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down several long-awaited decisions on the last regular day of its 2009
Term, among them McDonald v. City of Chicago. McDonald held, by a
5–4 majority, that the individual right to bear arms recognized in 2008 in
District of Columbia v. Heller constrains state and local governmental

14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
15. The Court’s constitutional case law makes no systematic distinction of the type sometimes
drawn between rationality in the sense of an absence of illogic and reasonability in the sense of
conforming to some normative standard of what makes good sense. For a succinct discussion of the
distinction, see JON ELSTER, REASON AND RATIONALITY 1–4 (Steven Rendall trans., 2009). Put in
terms of this distinction, footnote 27 proposes that the constitutional rule prohibits only laws that are
irrational, while this Article maintains that the traditional view is that the Constitution prohibits
rational but unreasonable laws as well.
16. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598 (resting decision on the “traditional view of the core concern of the
Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications”).
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action.17 The Court acknowledged through its timing the Justices’
awareness that the decision in McDonald was momentous and
unavoidably controversial. Commentators obligingly treated the
outcome as affording important clues to the purposes and future course
of action of the Roberts Court.18 Unfortunately, the commentators
generally looked in the wrong direction by focusing on the fact that a
majority upheld the gun-owners’ claim. That the outcome in McDonald,
like that in Heller, was of great human significance is undeniable—the
extent to which law-abiding citizens can possess operational firearms is
of life and death significance, although people argue over which side of
that dichotomy is at stake.19 But it is unclear that McDonald’s holding
was particularly significant in a broader jurisprudential sense. Having
decided in Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to bear arms,20 the further conclusion that it is “a provision of the
Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American
perspective”21 and therefore “applies equally to the Federal Government

17. The lead opinion in McDonald, written by Justice Alito, concluded that the Second
Amendment right the Court found in Heller applies to the states because of its incorporation into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). Justice Thomas reached the same outcome by way of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and therefore did not join the sections of Alito’s opinion rejecting the
petitioners’ argument based on that clause. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented. Most commentary on McDonald found this breakdown
of the Justices in McDonald unsurprising in that it replicated the vote in Heller, except for the
substitution of Sotomayor (a Democratic appointment to the Court) for Justice Souter (a “liberal” in
contemporary journalistic usage).
18. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Watch As We Make this Law Disappear,
SLATE, http://www.slate.com/id/2269715/ (Oct. 4, 2010) (arguing that the McDonald outcome is
evidence that the Roberts Court majority is successfully concealing an ideological agenda by
sometimes reaching results that are supported by some “left wing intellectuals”); Adam Winkler,
The Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts Moves Left, DAILY BEAST,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-02/supreme-court-under-chief-justiceroberts-moves-left/ (July 2, 2010) (arguing that McDonald among other decisions shows that the
Roberts Court is “not quite the extreme, right-wing court some people imagine it to be”).
19. Compare
David
Kopel,
A
Chance
to
Fight
Back,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/01/11/more-guns-less-crime/a-chance-to-fight-back
(last updated Jan. 12, 2011, 11:41 PM) (lawful possession of individual firearms saves lives), with
Guns, Democracy, and Freedom, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.csgv.org/issuesand-campaigns/guns-democracy-and-freedom (last visited May 3, 2011) (political campaign for
right to bear arms results in “real violence in our country”).
20. The respondent municipalities in McDonald did not ask the Court to reconsider Heller and
Justice Alito noted for the majority that “nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen the
question there decided.” McDonald, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3048. Justice Alito specifically had
in mind the “question of original meaning” that the Heller majority thought determinative on the
legal question of the Second Amendment’s meaning.
21. Id. at 3050.
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and the States,”22 is plausible.23 Whatever their societal importance,
however, it is not the holding in McDonald or Heller that should be
addressed, but rather a side-bar issue that appeared (in somewhat
different forms) in both cases.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller reached the
substantive merits and held the District of Columbia’s handgun
ordinance unconstitutional.24 In contrast, in McDonald, the lower federal
courts had thought themselves bound by old U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to dismiss a right-to-bear-arms challenge to two local handgun
laws. Justice Alito’s plurality opinion accordingly limited itself to
deciding that the Second Amendment right, through its incorporation in
the Fourteenth Amendment, is relevant to evaluating a local law’s
constitutionality.25 Whether the local ordinances are constitutional, and
precisely what standard of review to apply in determining the answers,
remains to be decided on remand.26 Alito did, however, state two
propositions that the plurality Justices presumably intend to bind future
decisions. First, he reiterated the Heller Court’s express repudiation of
any implication that the right to bear arms is absolute:
[O]ur holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding
regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” We repeat those
assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law
regulating firearms.27
Second, Alito countered Justice Breyer’s assertion in dissent that
“incorporation will require judges to assess the costs and benefits of

22. Id.
23. Id. at 3050. While McDonald does continue the incorporation process of applying the Bill of
Rights to the states, that process has almost reached its logical end-point. As Justice Alito noted,
only four provisions of the Bill of Rights remain unincorporated, id. at 3035 n.13, and two of those
(the grand jury requirement of the fifth and the civil jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment) are
excluded from incorporation by “considerations of stare decisis” that he suggested would govern the
Court if the issue should be raised. Id. at 3046.
24. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
25. McDonald, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3047 (citation omitted).
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firearms restrictions and thus to make difficult empirical judgments in an
area in which they lack expertise”:28
As we have noted, while [Justice Breyer’s] opinion in Heller
recommended an interest-balancing test, the Court specifically rejected
that suggestion. “The very enumeration of the right takes out of the
hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon.”29
Justice Breyer was unpersuaded. If the right is not absolute—and
Justice Alito both affirmed that it is not and gave examples of gun
control laws that might not violate it30—Breyer asked, how are courts to
decide which laws are valid and which transgress the constitutional
right?
In answering such questions judges cannot simply refer to
judicial homilies, such as Blackstone’s 18th-century perception
that a man’s home is his castle. Nor can the plurality so simply
reject, by mere assertion, the fact that “incorporation will require
judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions.”
How can the Court assess the strength of the government’s
regulatory interests without addressing issues of empirical fact?
How can the Court determine if a regulation is appropriately
tailored without considering its impact?31
Alito’s examples of (potentially) valid regulations of gun possession,
according to Breyer, have no basis other than the ipse dixit of the
McDonald plurality and before that of the Heller majority:
[T]he Court has haphazardly created a few simple rules . . . . But
why these rules and not others? Does the Court know that these
regulations are justified by some special gun-related risk of
death? In fact, the Court does not know. It has simply invented
rules that sound sensible without being able to explain why or
how Chicago’s handgun ban is different.32

28. Id. at 3050.
29. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 3047 (“repeat[ing the] assurances” in Heller that “our holding d[oes] not cast doubt on
such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’” (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 625–28 (2008))).
31. McDonald, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3127 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. Id. (citation omitted).
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There is an unfortunate tone of asperity in these comments that might
mislead the unwary reader into thinking that one side or the other is
guilty of a lapse in judicial candor—that Justice Alito is hiding the ball
or Justice Breyer is proposing that judges surreptitiously rewrite the
Constitution’s commands—but either conclusion would be wrong. Alito
and Breyer debated the question of how to think about a standard of
review for legislation affecting Second Amendment rights because they
disagree even more fundamentally, and as a matter of principle, over
what constitutional law is and how judges are to understand their task in
enforcing that law. Their debate over how to characterize the Second
Amendment right is a clue, if a somewhat murky one, to the nature of
this more profound disagreement.
In order to clarify what this deeper argument might be, it is useful to
turn to an earlier exchange in Heller, which lays behind the remarks of
Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald. In Heller, Justice Scalia for the
majority asserted that the district’s ordinance under review was
unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights . . . .”33 Breyer in dissent
responded that the ordinance “certainly would not be unconstitutional
under, for example, a ‘rational basis’ standard,”34 an observation that
Justice Scalia addressed in footnote 27. Justice Scalia acknowledged that
Breyer was correct that the Court would uphold the law under the
familiar rational-basis test, but according to majority that was irrelevant:
[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used
when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are
themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. In those cases,
“rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very
substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same
test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a
legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the
freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the
right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.35
The Heller dissenters ignored footnote 27, and so far it has attracted
little attention from commentators, who generally have focused on the
Second Amendment issues.36 The footnote’s apparent obscurity is
33. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
34. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 628 n.27 (citation omitted).
36. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on District of Columbia
v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (2008); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the HomeBound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun
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understandable, but a mistake, for it provides a deeply revealing window
into how at least two key members of the Roberts Court—Justice Scalia
and the Chief Justice himself—are attempting to reorient constitutional
law as a whole.37 The debate between Alito and Breyer in McDonald is
only one of several indications from the October Term 2009 that this
attempt is ongoing.38
The heart of this Article lies in the claim that footnote 27’s seemingly
offhand reference to the meaning of the rational-basis test indicates a
much broader constitutional vision that animates key members of the
Roberts Court. Rational-basis scrutiny, as traditionally understood, flows
from a presupposition of American constitutionalism so basic and
pervasive that it is easy to overlook: in its dealings with persons, the
American government is under a constitutional obligation to act
Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425
(2009).
37. Footnote 27 is admittedly dicta, and at another place in his Heller opinion, Justice Scalia
dismissed the importance of what he termed a “gratuitous” comment found in a footnote in an
earlier case. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 n.25 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–66 n.8
(1980)). “It is inconceivable,” Justice Scalia asserted, “that we would rest our interpretation of the
basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where
the point was not at issue and was not argued.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 n.25. In this regard, it is
ironic that footnote 27 quotes the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in criticism of Justice Breyer. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. Footnote 4, of
course, was a classic example of footnoted dicta on a “point . . . not at issue and . . . not argued,”
and for precisely that reason Justice Frankfurter vehemently objected in a later case when other
Justices suggested that footnote 4 represented a position endorsed by the Court. Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A footnote hardly seems to be an
appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote did not
purport to announce any new doctrine . . . .”). Despite Justice Frankfurter’s protest, that footnote
went on, of course, to become one of the best known and most influential statements in any judicial
opinion in American history, which gives one pause in resting too much on the suggestion that
footnoted dicta are of little importance. Footnote 27, in any event, is not the first example of Justice
Scalia placing a major statement about constitutional law in a footnote. See, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (discussing role of tradition in constitutional analysis); cf.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97–98 (1991) (“Justice
Scalia’s footnote 6 . . . seems destined to take its place alongside Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4
as one of constitutional law’s most provocative asides . . . .”). Today’s dictum is tomorrow’s ratio
decidendi, footnote or not.
38. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010) (majority opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (applying novel principle to limit Congress’s
authority to impair the president’s removal power); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (applying
novel concept of a compensable judicial taking); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (overruling two major precedents on regulation of campaign finance); id. at 920
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining his willingness to overrule the precedents: “When
considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of
having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right.”
(emphasis in original)).
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rationally. Rationality in turn requires both that public actions make
sense and that they make good sense, that they have some legitimate
purpose.39 The constitutional law of liberty and equality is, in short, a
mode of reasoning about what is rational in the public sphere—and
rational in this broad and partly normative sense.40 Footnote 27,
consistent with arguments that Justice Scalia has advanced elsewhere41
and that Chief Justice Roberts further explicated in an opinion issued
shortly before Heller,42 rests on a presupposition that is almost entirely
the reverse. What makes good sense—what is a legitimate end as
opposed to an illegitimate one—is a matter not for reason but for choice,
and as such it ineluctably belongs to the world of politics. The
Constitution, through the judicial enforcement of rules that are
themselves the product of political will, may set bounds on this political
domain but has no purchase within it. Constitutional law is a form of
reasoning about the irrational, about the line that necessarily separates
decisions that are susceptible to rule from those that are in the most
literal sense arbitrary—the expression of the will.
II.

THE GAP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND AND
JUDICIAL RULE DEFINES CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Footnote 27’s central assertion is that “‘rational basis’ is not just the
standard of scrutiny” in cases where the Court properly employs it, but is
“the very substance of the constitutional guarantee” itself.43 The
39. See the classic discussion in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 37–38, 41 (Yale Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1986).
40. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 927–
32 (2010) (discussing “the implicit normative premises of rational basis analysis”). The point is
neither novel nor controversial. See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (1979); Joseph Tussman
& Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345–46 (1949).
41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the “pronouncement of
constitutional law [that] rests primarily on value judgments”).
42. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008) (holding that in a public
employment context, “the very discretion that . . . state officials are entrusted to exercise” precludes
an equal protection challenge that the officials engaged in “the arbitrary singling out of a particular
person”).
43. Footnote 27 also claims that the U.S. Supreme Court does not employ the rational basis test
when the “constitutional command” at issue is “a specific, enumerated right.” Justice Breyer’s
invocation of the test was therefore entirely beside the point, because the Second Amendment is
enumerated. Although this sounds like a truism—of course the flaccid rational basis test has no
application when enumerated constitutional rights are at stake!—it is less self-evidently true than a
careless reader might think. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rational Basis and Enumerated Rights
(manuscript on file with author).
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distinction Justice Scalia is drawing in this observation reflects the
omnipresence of doctrine in constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court
often announces, applies, or rejects constitutional doctrines—the
standards or tests or modes of scrutiny or implementation that the Court
employs in applying the Constitution to particular cases.44 In terms of
legal method, as Professor Henry Paul Monaghan pointed out in a
seminal article, such doctrines involve “the creation of a common law
substructure to carry out the purposes and policies” of the Constitution’s
commands.45 Like traditional common law decisionmaking, the creation
of constitutional doctrine reflects a judicial evaluation and choice among
competing means of executing the principles in question, although the
Justices often do not comment on the rationales for (and against)
particular doctrines.46 This sort of second-order discussion, when it does
occur, almost always confirms the “strategic” nature of doctrine:
doctrinal formulations blend the Justices’ understanding of the
Constitution’s meaning with the practicalities of judicial
decisionmaking.47 The following examples illustrate this theme.

44. There is no single or canonical definition of “doctrine” in constitutional law, although in
recent years a number of eminent constitutional scholars have devoted considerable effort to
examining what aspects of constitutional law the term encompasses. See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). I am not using the word in any precise or highly theoretical sense.
Professor Denning has written a valuable essay on this scholarship in relation to Heller. Brannon P.
Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller,
75 TENN. L. REV. 789 (2008).
45. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1975). Monaghan argued that such doctrines ought to be subject to
congressional modification. Id. at 3 (“[C]onstitutional common law [ought to be] subject to
amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.”). The Court declined to adopt this view as
to the Miranda warnings in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000), discussed infra at
the text accompanying notes 63–67.
46. In addition to footnote 27, Heller contains an interesting back and forth between Justices
Scalia and Breyer over Breyer’s answer to the question “[w]hat kind of constitutional standard
should the Court use” in applying the Second Amendment? Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 687 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Breyer argued that in practice any
standard will “turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other,” and proposed
“adopt[ing] such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.” Id. at 689. Justice Scalia responded that
such “a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” would be unprecedented and contrary to the
very purpose of the “enumeration of the right.” Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
47. For the adjective “strategic,” and an insightful study of this aspect of constitutional doctrine,
see FALLON, supra note 44, at 5 (“[T]he Court devises and then implements strategies for enforcing
constitutional values.”). Professor Fallon clearly does not intend, nor do I in adopting his
terminology, any suggestion of ulterior, much less improper motivation on the Court’s part.
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In Grutter v. Bollinger,48 Justice O’Connor explained that the Court
has ordained the use of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases involving
explicit racial classifications in order to identify those situations in
which classifications are in fact being used for a constitutionally
improper purpose:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures, we have no way to determine what
“classifications are benign or remedial and what classifications
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority
or simple racial politics.” We apply strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications to smoke out illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. . . .
....
. . . Strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context.49
Justice O’Connor’s rationale, which she first articulated in the City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.50 decision years before, is quite different
from that which Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence in Croson. In
Croson, Justice Kennedy wrote that in light of the Court’s case law,
strict scrutiny was the appropriate means to respect stare decisis while
implementing what he saw as the Constitution’s almost per se ban on
racial classifications regardless of governmental purpose: “On the
assumption that it will vindicate the principle of race neutrality found in
the Equal Protection Clause, I accept the less absolute rule” of strict
scrutiny.51 Where Justice O’Connor saw strict scrutiny as an affirmative
tool enabling the courts to uncover unconstitutional state action
masquerading under a claim of legitimacy, Justice Kennedy perceived an
underenforcement of the actual constitutional norm, acceptable only on
the assumption that the shortfall in constitutional principle would be
minimal.
In another setting, Justice Kennedy explained that his deliberate
adoption of a standard not itself directly commanded by the
48. 539 U.S. 306 (2002).
49. Id. at 326, 327 (majority opinion of O’Connor, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
51. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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constitutional text rested on the need to reconcile constitutional
commitments that are potentially in tension with one another. Writing
for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,52 Justice Kennedy explained
his articulation of a new doctrinal standard by referring to the danger
posed to one constitutional principle—Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment is a power to remedy or prevent violations of the
amendment53—by another constitutional principle—Congress must have
“wide latitude” to devise remedial legislation:54
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive [i.e., not remedial] in operation and effect. History
and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent
from the text of the Amendment.55
The Constitution itself distinguishes the remedial legislation it
authorizes from the substantive it does not; the test of congruence and
proportionality is the means Justice Kennedy devised to enable the Court
to police Congress’s (possibly innocent) tendency to overreach.56
What has been for many decades the Court’s standard explanation for
rational-basis scrutiny in equal protection cases is very similar, only
there the Court’s stated concern has been to police itself and other courts
against overreaching into the constitutional domain of the legislature.
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in FCC v. Beach
Communications57 is typical:
This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer
antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think
a political branch has acted.”58

52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
53. Id. at 519.
54. Id. at 520.
55. Id.
56. Although Justice Kennedy commanded a near-unanimous Court in City of Boerne on this
issue, the congruence and proportionality test is already under considerable strain, with Justice
Scalia having expressly rejected it. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 561–65 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), discussed infra notes 80–84.
57. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
58. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 (1979)).
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Justice Thomas continued, “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding
principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”59
The rational-basis test, like the congruence and proportionality test, is
instrumental or strategic, the means by which the judiciary avoids its
own (doubtless innocent) temptation to correct unwise legislative
choices.
In Dickerson v. United States,60 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a 1968 statutory provision that was an unabashed
congressional attempt to overrule the famous Miranda v. Arizona61
decision. Language in post-Miranda opinions strongly implied that
Miranda was not directly justified by the Constitution and, in dissent,
Justice Scalia said as much. He insisted that the Court lacked the
authority to invalidate the act of Congress, there being no violation of
the Constitution.62 For the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that
warnings required by Miranda are not “required by the Constitution, in
the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional
requirements”; the warnings were a strategic device created and imposed
by the Court because the Justices believed existing practice ran an
unacceptably high risk of permitting unconstitutional criminal
convictions.63 The fact that the warnings themselves are not directly
commanded by the Constitution, however, did not make Miranda subor non-constitutional in nature. Such a decision is “a normal part of
constitutional law”64 and it “announced a constitutional rule”65 that,
unless changed by the Court, is as obligatory as the direct commands of
the Constitution’s text.66 Therefore, judge-made constitutional doctrine
59. Id. at 315 (quoting Lehnhusen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973)).
60. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
61. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
62. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause a majority of the Court does
not believe [that violating Miranda violates the Constitution, the Court] acts in plain violation of the
Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress.”).
63. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
64. Id. at 441.
65. Id. at 444.
66. Despite Justice Scalia’s characteristic vigor in expressing his disagreement with the
Dickerson majority, id. at 457–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking as “a lawless practice” the
imposition of prophylactic rules that go beyond the actual substance of constitutional prohibitions),
it is a mistake to read his Dickerson opinion as an outright rejection of doctrine. See, e.g., Maryland
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220–24 (2010) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.)
(adopting, after considering benefits and costs of various rules, a fourteen-day presumption that a
confession is involuntary under Edwards v. Arizona after a break in custody); Montejo v. Louisiana,
556 U.S.___, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (discussing the proper
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can impose restrictions on other governmental entities that go beyond
what the Constitution itself directly requires where, in the Court’s view,
doing so is necessary to protect a constitutional norm.
The Justices agree—or at least they agreed before footnote 27 in
Heller—that constitutional doctrine is strategic. In other words, the
Court crafts doctrinal rules in light of the Justices’ perceptions of the
courts’ capabilities, the practical consequences of adopting (or failing to
adopt) the rule, and the likelihood in the given circumstances that there
has been an actual violation of the Constitution. There is, then, a gap
between what the direct command of the Constitution literally requires,
what must of necessity be done by the courts or other entities “to satisfy
[the letter of the] constitutional requirements,”67 and what the Court
deems appropriate or even essential in the enforcement of those
requirements. It is the existence of this gap between constitutional
command and judicial rule, in a sense, that defines constitutional
doctrine.
III. THE OPERATION OF STARE DECISIS DEPENDS UPON
WHETHER THE ISSUE IS FRAMED AS ONE OF “FAULTY
DOCTRINE” OR “ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION”
The obvious question at this point is whether there is anything more
than theoretical significance to the fact that constitutional doctrine is
characterized by the admitted doctrinal gap between its content and the
Constitution’s direct commands. At first glance, Dickerson might seem
to eliminate any practical distinction between a rule or standard that the
Constitution literally requires and a rule or standard that is the product of
the Court’s doctrinal creativity. The latter, so long as the Court adheres
to it, is as binding as the former.68 If the Court recognizes no pragmatic

reasoning to apply “[w]hen this Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional
right”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have no
problem with a system of abstract tests such as rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny
(though I think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we
feel like it). Such formulas are essential to evaluating whether the new restrictions that a changing
society constantly imposes upon private conduct comport with that ‘equal protection’ our society
has always accorded in the past.”).
67. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
68. Dickerson is a particularly striking case in this regard because Miranda itself had
acknowledged that there might be other, legislative means of insuring against the constitutional
violations that the Miranda warnings were meant to prevent. This is an unusual admission by the
Court that the very doctrine it was creating was contingent and subject to political rethinking. The
statutory provision that Congress enacted, however, was simply an attempt to restore the legal test
that the Miranda Court had found inadequate to protect the constitutional norms—it was, in short,
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distinction between the Constitution’s commands and its own doctrinal
elaborations, footnote 27’s equation of command and doctrine in the
context of rational-basis scrutiny might seem of no real significance. In
fact, however, the doctrinal gap plays a critical role in the judicial
elaboration of constitutional law because of its significance in the
application of stare decisis.
Any sensible resolution of the difficult question of when the Court
should overrule constitutional precedent has to depend, in part, on
whether the challenge to the precedent rests on the claim that the earlier
Court misunderstood the Constitution itself, or instead that the doctrinal
strategy it adopted for implementing the Constitution turned out to be
faulty. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Croson expressly
recognized the possibility that he might subsequently rethink his
willingness to employ strict scrutiny in the analysis of affirmative action
programs.69 He concurred in the Court’s use of strict scrutiny, which is a
doctrinal tool that is less absolute than a per se ban on racial
classifications, on the assumption that strict scrutiny would “vindicate
the principle of race neutrality found in the Equal Protection Clause.”70
If in practice strict scrutiny proved to allow uses of race that undermined
that principle, Justice Kennedy was prepared to discard the doctrine
notwithstanding stare decisis.71 The sort of argument relevant to
persuading Justice Kennedy to act on this announced reservation would
concern not the meaning of equal protection, but the practical results of
applying strict scrutiny.
Justices are not usually so explicit about the possible problems with
the doctrine they are announcing, but a reservation similar to Justice
Kennedy’s in Croson is implicit in every explanation of a Justice’s or the
Court’s adoption of a particular doctrine. Consider Justice O’Connor’s
doctrinal explanation in Grutter, which quoted from her Croson opinion
announcing strict scrutiny as the test for evaluating race-based
affirmative action.72 The rationale for using the test, she wrote, is that it

an attempt by Congress to overrule the Court rather than to meet the Court’s concerns in some other
fashion.
69. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“On the assumption that [strict scrutiny] will vindicate the
principle of race neutrality” concluding that “I am not convinced we need adopt [a per se rule] at
this point.”).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). To be
precise, Croson adopted strict scrutiny for state and local-governmental use of race in affirmative
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“provide[s] a framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker,”73
thus enabling the courts “to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”74 Implicit in this reasoning is the
reservation that Justice O’Connor (or the Court) would adopt a different
approach if strict scrutiny were shown to be inadequate or misguided as
a means of “smoking out” illegitimate uses of race.75
In Croson, Justice O’Connor’s rationale for employing strict scrutiny
seems to rely on an underlying view of equal protection that identifies
the intentional or purposeful infliction of harm as the primary concern of
equal protection with respect to race—strict scrutiny “smokes out”
concealed purposes of that prohibited kind—while Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence identifies “race neutrality” as the constitutional principle at
stake. The arguments crafted to convince Justice O’Connor that she
adopt Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the Constitution76—or that
Justice Kennedy adopt Justice O’Connor’s—would be quite different
from those crafted merely to convince either to adopt a different
doctrinal approach in order to implement an understanding of the
constitutional norm that remained unchanged. Because of the presence
of the doctrinal gap, for either Justice to modify or even abandon strict
scrutiny as the appropriate test in affirmative action cases would be
nothing more than what Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dickerson called “the
sort of modifications” that are “a normal part of constitutional law”
because “no constitutional rule is immutable.”77
action. The later Adarand decision, in an opinion also written by Justice O’Connor applied the test
to federal actions. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
74. Id. at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. There is an interesting ambiguity in Justice O’Connor’s explanation. Her reference to strict
scrutiny determining whether the government has “a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool” suggests a quite different rationale for using this doctrine: a direct weighing of
the importance of the governmental purpose—ex hypothesi legitimate or benign as opposed to
covertly malicious—against the harm to constitutional values. See id. at 327.
76. Her language suggesting that strict scrutiny balances governmental purpose against individual
interest makes it slightly unclear what Justice O’Connor’s understanding of the underlying
constitutional norm is, but the predominant impression, I think, is that created by her invocation of
the “smoking out” metaphor.
77. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000). As the Chief Justice noted, “No court
laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will
seek to apply it.” Id. Dickerson reminds us that because of stare decisis, the burden of persuading a
Justice or the Court to abandon altogether a doctrine is considerably greater than is required to
convince the Court to make adjustments to the doctrine.
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Justice Scalia’s changing view of the congruence and proportionality
test adopted in City of Boerne is a good example of a Justice responding
to later experience that, in his view, shows a doctrinal approach to be
misguided. Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
without any stated reservation about the new doctrinal formulation,78
although in a later opinion, he stated that he joined in the City of Boerne
opinion “with some misgiving . . . because [such tests] have a way of
turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges’ policy
preferences.”79 But in Tennessee v. Lane,80 the second of two decisions81
that he thought failed to respect the underlying constitutional norm
despite their application of the test, Justice Scalia announced a change of
position:
I yield to the lessons of experience. The “congruence and
proportionality” standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven
decisionmaking. . . .
I would replace “congruence and proportionality” with
another test—one that provides a clear, enforceable limitation
supported by the text of § 5.82
As he made clear in his opinion in Lane, Justice Scalia continued to
agree with the City of Boerne Court’s interpretation of the constitutional
norm governing Congress’s exercise of the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment; it was the doctrinal approach in that decision,
not its understanding of the amendment, that he concluded was faulty.83
In contrast, an argument aimed at convincing Justices that they should
repudiate or substantially modify parts of their understandings of the
Constitution itself asks them to confess error on an altogether more
fundamental level. Such arguments are, unsurprisingly, rarely
successful. Even more rarely do Justices admit that they have changed
their minds at the level of underlying constitutional understanding. The
78. Justice Scalia declined to join one subsection of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, dealing with the
legislative history in Congress of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but stated no concerns
with the substance of the congruence and proportionality test. City of Boerne v. Flores, 520 U.S.
507, 511 n.* (1997).
79. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
81. The other decision was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
82. Lane, 541 U.S. at 557–58
83. Justice Scalia’s explanation of his proposed replacement for the City of Boerne test is an
unusually explicit discussion of the process by which a Justice reaches a doctrinal position. See id.
at 561–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court itself, as a corporate body, does admit to error of this sort with
some frequency, but as a matter of fact such shifts in interpretation
usually reflect changes in the Court’s membership rather than in the
individual Justices’ mindsets.
The doctrinal gap between the Court’s articulation of the case law that
implements the Constitution, and the Justices’ often conflicting views on
the meaning of the Constitution itself, marks for most purposes the
boundary between the domain of legal arguments that might plausibly
lead to a change in the Court’s position, and that area in which the
Justices’ commitments to their vision of constitutional principle are too
deep to change. In the realm of doctrine, the presence of strategic
considerations makes constitutional law fluid, flexible, and open to the
sorts of change and adjustment that Chief Justice Rehnquist called “a
normal part of constitutional law.”84 On the other hand, the latter realm
of principled commitment to underlying constitutional meaning is
relatively static, fixed by the divergent visions of individual Justices that
are shaped largely by what the great Chief Justice John Marshall called
“the wishes, the affections, and the general theories” of the individual.85
Because such factors are far more deeply a part of the individual, they
are far less susceptible to change.86 Where there is little or no doctrinal
84. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
85. JOHN MARSHALL, 4 LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 394 (The Citizens Guild 1926) (1805).
One of Marshall’s most distinguished successors, Charles Evans Hughes, is reported to have made a
very similar point: “‘At the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is
emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.’” WILLIAM
O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939 TO 1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS
8 (Random House ed., 1980) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes).
86. Individual Justices (and other constitutionalists) differ not only in the substance of their
commitments but in the range of constitutional issues about which they hold fixed as opposed to
fluid views. Justices who have relatively small areas of constitutional law in which they have deep
commitments about underlying meaning, or whose commitments are more complex (or confused,
according to their critics), notoriously can enjoy a disproportionate sway over the Court’s outcomes
because far more cases end up for them on the flexible, fluid side of the doctrinal gap. One thinks of
Justice Powell on the Burger Court, Justice O’Connor on the Rehnquist Court, and, perhaps, Justice
Kennedy on the Roberts Court. Commentators tend to lump such “swing-vote” Justices together as
exemplars of a common characteristic, with the commentators divided over whether the Justices’
behavior is admirably judicious or hopelessly inconsistent. See, e.g., Douglas M. Parker, Justice
Kennedy: The Swing Voter and His Critics, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 317 (2008) (discussing claims that
Justice Kennedy is inconsistent); C. Lincoln Combs, A Curious Choice: Hibbs v. Winn as a Case
Study of Sandra Day O’Connor’s Balancing Jurisprudence, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 192 (2005)
(“Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudential style has been called many things: accommodationist,
marginalist, pragmatic, inconsistent, and unpredictable. Perhaps the best way to describe her judicial
analysis is ‘balancing.’”); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987) (arguing that “Powell’s balancing approach
confused the role of juror and Justice, the role of legislator and Justice, and ultimately the role of
citizen and Justice”). My own view is that the mere fact that a Justice seems often to be the “swing
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gap between the Court’s approach to deciding particular issues and the
Justices’ underlying constitutional commitments, precedent tends to be
brittle—hard and unyielding insofar as it commands five votes, while
susceptible to unconvincing “application” or simple repudiation when it
lacks, or loses, a consistent majority.
IV. DOCTRINAL DECISIONS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The distinction between constitutional doctrine and the commands of
the Constitution that doctrine is meant to implement is not only
important for its role in the Court’s dealings with its own precedents. It
is equally or even more important for the part it plays in defining the role
of the political branches of government as constitutional interpreters.
Footnote 27’s reconstruction of the relationship between rational-basis
scrutiny and the underlying constitutional rule has profound implications
for the role of the political branches in the implementation of the
Constitution: the footnote implicitly discards one of the most important
points in contemporary constitutional law where political-branch
implementation can play a role.87
A.

The Non-Exclusivity of the Judicial Power to “Say What
(Constitutional) Law Is”

In theory at least, it would be possible to treat the Constitution as the
concern solely of the judiciary. Other governmental actors (legislatures,
high executive officers, administrators, police officers) would be
normatively free to do whatever they thought best, with the Constitution
and the judiciary’s enforcement of it as solely a matter of external
constraint. On this view, if other governmental actors (legislature,
executive, etc.) can get away with X without interference from the
courts, the Constitution itself should give them no other pause: it is the
vote” says little in itself other than that the Court is polarized over issues about which the Justice in
question often does not have a broad and unyielding commitment on the question of underlying
constitutional meaning.
87. I am not concerned in this Article with the related but distinct issue of the executive branch’s
obligation to enforce federal-court judgments even when the Executive conscientiously believes that
the court is in error. While that question is apparently of great interest to scholars, see, for example,
William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008), I believe that it is settled, and
rightly so, as a matter of judicial and executive practice. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY
BUILT ON WORDS 127 (2003) (referring to the almost “unbroken tradition of executive branch
implementation of judicial decisions”); id. at 207 (“American executive officers must obey judicial
orders, at least once affirmed at the highest level.”).
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judges’ concern, not theirs. Some people think the American system was
designed this way, and many more believe (or fear) that it is the
American norm in practice.88 From this perspective, the Constitution
stands to governmental officials, other than judges, roughly as the
Internal Revenue Code does to taxpayers. There are rules that the
taxpayer must not transgress, on pain of external sanction, but as long as
he stays within those rules the taxpayer owes no further regard to the
purposes of the Code. As Judge Learned Hand wrote, “Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is
not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”89 The Code imposes no
internal obligations.
On the analogous view of the Constitution, governmental officials
(except judges—but why are they different?) owe nothing to the
Constitution for its own sake, except the duty to obey judicial orders
issued in the Constitution’s name (but, again, why?). The domain of
politics and the domain of constitutional principle have only one
necessary point of contact: the constitutional domain sets bounds on the
political branches. Beyond respecting orders policing that boundary,
political decisionmakers may simply ignore the Constitution and its
judicial guardians. There is no need for political actors to interpret the
Constitution or concern themselves independently with its
implementation. The only constitutional advice a lawyer could really
give a legislator or executive officer would be a prediction about
whether the courts would interfere, and if so what the courts would be
likely to do. This perspective treats non-judicial officials as if they were
supposed to behave like Holmes’s famous Bad Man, interested only in
predicting what penalties, if any, their conduct might incur.90
The Constitution as an “Internal Revenue Code” dovetails nicely with
the U.S. Supreme Court as a constitutional oracle, a position usually
associated, perhaps unfairly, with the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron.91
Cooper, signed by all nine Justices, famously asserted:
[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated
by this Court in the Brown [v. Board of Education] case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes
88. For a recent searching discussion of this subject in the context of habeas corpus suspension,
see Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533
(2007).
89. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
90. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
91. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’”92
If the political branches of government have no role in determining the
meaning and implementation of the Constitution, those activities fall by
default into judicial hands and, given the hierarchical nature of the
American judiciary, that means the Supreme Court of the United States.
There is no mystery about the obligation to give Miranda warnings or
desegregate schools; the Court’s decisions define both as constitutional
obligations, period. With regard to whatever the Court deems to be a
constitutional matter, its views exhaustively address any questions.
There is no normative space, as it were, for political actors to interpret
the Constitution or concern themselves with its implementation beyond
obeying court orders, for to do so would be to usurp the exclusive role of
the judiciary.93 Judicial enforcement defines constitutional obligation.
As a historical matter, however, this perspective on the Constitution is
clearly not the best understanding of the American constitutional
tradition. At the simplest level, it implies an eviscerated view of the
constitutional oath required of all American governmental officers that
directly contradicts part of the reasoning by which John Marshall
defended the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.94 There
are those who believe that the oath is nothing more than a pledge of
allegiance to the American political system,95 but the mainstream view
has been that legislators and executive officials have an independent
duty to interpret and implement the Constitution.96 Evidence to this
effect is not difficult to find: City of Boerne aimed to curb congressional
overzealousness in promoting legislative views of the Constitution’s

92. Id. at 18. In the context of Cooper, the Justices’ immediate point was to reject the legitimacy
of any attempt by state governmental officials to interfere with federal-court desegregation orders
and perhaps they meant only the point Dickerson was to make decades later, that political actors
cannot “supersede [the Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution,” except of
course through the amendment process. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
93. Obviously someone holding this view would need to nuance it considerably to address such
practical issues as constitutional questions not yet addressed by the judiciary, situations in which it
might seem clear what the courts would rule but unclear that any court would actually be able to
entertain a case allowing a ruling, and the interpretation of ambiguities in judicial decisions. We can
leave to one side these issues for resolution by the advocates of an imperial judiciary.
94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. On this issue, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE 3–6 (2008).
96. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 200 (1994) (“There will be some occasions [when] the President can and should exercise his
independent judgment to determine whether the statute is constitutional.”).
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meaning.97 In doing so, however, the Court stated its respect for
Congress’s exercise of the authority to construe and apply the
Constitution:
In 1789, when a Member of the House of Representatives
objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation based
on the theory that “it would be officious” to consider the
constitutionality of a measure that did not affect the House,
James Madison explained that “it is incontrovertibly of as much
importance to this branch of the Government as to any other,
that the constitution should be preserved entire. It is our duty.”98
President Madison took the same view of the executive branch’s relation
to the Constitution,99 but this observation does not depend on his
admittedly huge stature as a constitutionalist. From the beginning, the
almost universal acceptance by Americans of judicial review has gone
hand-in-hand with a widespread understanding that other governmental
officials have a duty to govern themselves by the Constitution and not
merely to avoid constitutional entanglements with the courts.
B.

Doctrinal Underenforcement of the Constitution

What this Article calls the “doctrinal gap,” the distinction between the
doctrines that the judiciary follows in its exercise of judicial review and
the commands of the Constitution in itself, is a primary source of the
normative space in which political actors can and should undertake their
own task of constitutional review (or self-review).100 For example,
97. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“City of Boerne also
confirmed . . . that it falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees. . . . We distinguish appropriate prophylactic legislation from ‘substantive redefinition of
the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue’ by applying the test set forth in City of Boerne.” (citation
omitted)).
98. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 521, 535 (1997) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (1789)).
99. See H. Jefferson Powell, Law as a Tool, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE
250–64 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds. 2009).
100. This is, to be sure, fully the case only when judicial doctrine falls short of full enforcement
of the actual constitutional norm. Where, as in the Miranda rule upheld in Dickerson, doctrine limits
political action beyond what the Constitution itself directly requires, different considerations apply.
Dickerson and City of Boerne (both of which invalidated acts of Congress passed in direct response
to constitutional decisions by the Court) make it clear that the Court will not acquiesce in simple
attempts by Congress to replace in practice the Court’s constitutional views with the legislature’s,
but it does not follow that there is no normative space for independent political-branch
constitutional interpretation in situations of judicial “overenforcement.” Miranda expressly
contemplated the possibility of other, legislatively ordained means for securing the constitutional
principles at stake other than by the Court’s prescribed warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440–42 (2000) (discussing why the
congressional response failed to satisfy the Miranda Court’s concerns). Perhaps “the Miranda
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Congress’s power to spend money, the Court has said, is limited by
several “general restrictions,” the first of which “is derived from the
language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”101 As the Court has noted,
“The level of deference” that courts must give “to the congressional
decision [whether an expenditure is for the general welfare] is such that
the Court has . . . questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially
enforceable restriction at all.”102 In fact, while the Court has not gone
quite so far as to deem the issue a non-justiciable political question,103
two things are nonetheless clear: the spending power is constitutionally
limited by the requirement that it serve the general welfare and it is
Congress (and the President through exercise of the veto power) that is
primarily charged with the responsibility of enforcing the constitutional
limitation. Judicial doctrine, which in this area employs a quite sensible
rule of deference to congressional judgments about what expenditures
are in the national interest, leaves a very substantial area in which the
constitutional limitation at issue must be implemented by the political
branches or else go unobserved.
The best known argument resting on this observation is probably
Lawrence Sager’s 1978 article on the judicial underenforcement of
constitutional norms.104 In contrast to what he viewed as the prevailing
assumption that “the legal scope of a constitutional norm [is] inevitably
coterminous with the scope of its federal judicial enforcement,” Dean
Sager argued that “governmental officials are legally obligated to obey
the full scope of constitutional norms which are underenforced by the
federal courts . . . .”105 The Equal Protection Clause, in his view,
Court’s invitation for legislative action,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440, is implicit in any situation
where the Court announces doctrine that is prophylactic in nature.
101. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 & n.2 (1987).
102. Id.
103. The per curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), arguably reached that
conclusion. See id. at 90 (“It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will promote the general
welfare.”). But if so, Dole marked a slight retreat, both in terms of the Court’s language (“courts
should defer substantially”) and its actions (the Court briefly but substantively considered whether
the act of Congress under review was “reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare”). 483
U.S. at 207, 208.
104. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Dean Sager perhaps underestimated the extent to which his
was in fact an elegant restatement of a long-standing if rather inchoate presupposition of
mainstream constitutional thought that two other important scholars had already identified. See Paul
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585,
594–99 (1975); Monaghan, supra note 45.
105. Sager, supra note 104, at 1213, 1264.
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provides a clear example of such underenforcement, because the general
or default doctrine that applies to most equal protection challenges is the
extremely permissive rational-basis test. Under that test, “only a small
part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal and unjust treatment
by government is seriously considered by the federal courts; the vast
majority of such claims are dismissed out of hand.” In Sager’s view, we
depend upon “other governmental actors for the preservation of the
principles embodied in ” the Equal Protection Clause.106
Dean Sager’s article has been influential,107 and justly so, as a
powerful interpretation of central aspects of modern equal protection
doctrine. In doing so, Sager suggested a means for identifying a proper
role
for
political-branch
constitutional
interpretation
and
implementation: Congress and the Executive have a special
responsibility to safeguard the Constitution’s norms where those norms
are not or cannot be fully protected by judicial review. As a formal legal
opinion issued by the Department of Justice in 1996 put it:
The conclusion that a particular provision of proposed
legislation probably would not be held unconstitutional by the
courts is not equivalent to a determination that the legislation is
constitutional per se. The judiciary is limited, properly, in its
ability to enforce the Constitution, both by Article III’s
requirements of jurisdiction and justiciability and by the
obligation to defer to the political branches in cases of doubt or
where Congress or the President has special constitutional
responsibility. In such situations, the executive branch’s regular
obligation to ensure, to the full extent of its ability, that
constitutional requirements are respected is heightened by the
absence or reduced presence of the courts’ ordinary
guardianship of the Constitution’s requirements.108
Parallel observations about the constitutional responsibilities of
Congress and state governments would be equally apposite. The
106. Id. at 1263. Sager cited “the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment [sic],
particularly in its substantive application,” id. at 1220, as another good example of an underenforced
norm, presumably because the general or default doctrinal inquiry in substantive due process cases
is, once again, the rational-basis test.
107. Professor Fallon—himself a major voice in constitutional scholarship—has recently listed
Sager’s Fair Measure as one of those “works that are almost universally regarded as being of
highest quality.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 693, 707 (2009).
108. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 180 (1996). This opinion was written by the distinguished constitutional scholar Walter
Dellinger, then serving as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel,
and thus one of the President’s chief legal advisors.
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normative space that exists between the Constitution’s actual commands
and U.S. Supreme Court doctrine that underenforces those commands
can be, and pursuant to their oaths ought to be, occupied by the
constitutional decisions of non-judicial officials.109
C.

Williamson v. Lee Optical Is an Example of Judicial
Underenforcement Through Rational-Basis Scrutiny

A concrete example of judicial underenforcement through rationalbasis scrutiny is useful at this point. Consider a staple of Constitutional
Law I classes, Williamson v. Lee Optical. Opticians challenged an
Oklahoma statute that made it unlawful for anyone other than a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist “to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or
replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except upon
written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma licensed ophthalmologist
or optometrist.”110 The district court concluded that because the law
“prohibit[ed] the wearers of eyeglasses from exchanging their frames
either to obtain more modern designs or because the former frames are
broken, without first visiting an ophthalmologist or optometrist, ” the
law’s practical effect was to “divert[] from the optician a very
substantial, as well as profitable, part of his business.”111 Because “the
knowledge necessary to perform these services is strictly artisan in
character and can skillfully and accurately be performed without the
professional knowledge and training essential to qualify as a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist,” the district court held that the statute
was “unreasonable and discriminatory” and violated both the Due
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses.112

109. Dean Sager believed that state courts should be included in the list of constitutional actors
with the duty and authority to act in the doctrinal gap created by federal-court underenforcement.
Sager, supra note 104, at 1242–63. The U.S. Supreme Court appears to have rejected that view. See,
e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) (“[W]hen a state court
reviews state legislation challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to
impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has imposed.”).
Whether the Court was right to do so is beyond the scope of this Article.
110. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 485 (1955). The case also involved a separate
claim by an ophthalmologist who challenged a section of the statute that prohibited kickbacks and
related conduct. The district court rejected his claim, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, and no one
today has any interest in that part of the decision. I have passed over other details that, like the outof-luck ophthalmologist’s argument, are of no current concern.
111. Lee Optical v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 135 (D.C. Okla. 1954) (three-judge court),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
112. Id. at 135, 139.
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The district court clearly thought the statute was what later economic
jargon would term rent-seeking legislation, a successful attempt by the
ophthalmologists and optometrists to appropriate part of the opticians’
business through manipulation of the legislative process, with no publicfocused purpose at all.113 The conclusion that, on those facts, the law
was invalid seems entirely defensible, at least on the assumption that
statutory classifications and intrusions on liberty must serve some
legitimate public purpose.114
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by
Justice Douglas. The Court was not in the dark about the unmistakable
economic effect, and no doubt the sub rosa intended purpose of the
instigators, of the law under review.115 Indeed, it hardly requires a close
reading of his text to sense that Douglas drafted his opinion to protect
the Court, or himself, from any charge of naïveté. “The Oklahoma law
may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases,” Douglas
conceded, but added:
The legislature might have concluded that [situations where it is
not are common enough] to justify this regulation of the fitting
of eyeglasses. . . . [T]he legislature might have concluded that
[an examination by an ophthalmologist or optometrist] was
needed often enough to require one in every case. . . . To be

113. See Chris M. Franchetti, Not Seeing Eye to Eye: Chapter 8 and the Battle Over Prescription
Eyewear, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 474, 475–76 (1999) (“[T]he optical industry, understandably, is
highly competitive. However, as partially evidenced by the infamous controversy which gave rise to
Williamson v. Lee Optical in 1955, such vigorous competition may be less than healthy. For
decades, various industry participants have battled for control of eyewear sales, producing
government investigations, lawsuits, and allegedly unethical political influence in the process.”).
114. The Court of the 1950s accepted this principle. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499–500 (1954) (“Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free
to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.”).
115. Justice Douglas himself was an experienced observer of business behavior and highly
unlikely to have been in doubt about the nature of the Oklahoma law. In any case, the opticians
made the point starkly clear:
The undisputed record evidence clearly establishes that optometrists in Oklahoma and
elsewhere are in direct competition with opticians in the sale of eyeglasses, frames and lenses,
and because of their economic dependence upon the sale of those articles, the merchandising
interests of the optometrist play a dominant part in the establishment of their professional
objectives and activities. . . . The direct effect of [the law] is to transfer from the optician to the
optometrist a large and profitable portion of the former’s business. [It] contains no regulations
or standards for opticians but rather is a discriminatory statute that arbitrarily takes from the
optician a major portion of his lawful business. . . . all the evidence introduced demonstrates
that the fitting, adjusting and duplication of eyeglasses by opticians is not an “evil” and that the
prohibitions contained in [the law] have no real and substantial relationship to the announced
purpose of the act—the protection of the public’s health and welfare.
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 20, 24, 51, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(Nos. 184 & 185).
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sure, the present law does not [actually require this,] . . . . [b]ut
the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional.116
The discussion is, intellectually, entirely in the subjunctive, a matter of
theoretical possibilities with no relationship to the opticians’ factual
claim that the law was simply a means of transferring much of the
opticians’ business to their competitors.117
Justice Douglas’s statement of why this exercise in legal fantasy was
sufficient to decide the case was very brief: “The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.”118 And with that exercise in nonexplanation, the Court, almost certainly knowing what it was doing,
allowed one side in an economic competition for profits to manipulate
the competitive playing field through legislation, to the likely detriment
of everyone in Oklahoma except the successful interest group.119 As we
know, however, the Court had a reason for its decision, one that had
nothing to do with eyeglasses or interest groups: the Justices’ desire to
make unmistakably clear their repudiation of the vigorous protection of
economic liberty through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
associated with Lochner v. New York.120
For veterans of the New Deal battle over judicial supremacy such as
Justice Douglas, Lochner was the paradigm of a Court utterly forgetful
of its duty to observe the limits on its own power and of the respect it

116. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88 (emphasis added) (rejecting the due process claim); see also
id. at 489 (rejecting the equal protection claim on similarly hypothetical grounds).
117. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 52, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(Nos. 184 & 185) (“Rather, it is the law that deprives opticians of a substantial portion of their
business, which deprived portion of the opticians’ business is transferred to optometrists or else
channeled into the hands of a few opticians who possess the favor of ophthalmologists.”).
118. 348 U.S. at 488.
119. See Franchetti, supra note 113, at 489 (“[F]or optometrists nationwide, the case represented
a significant early victory in the optical-industry battle. It confirmed that the activities of the
profession’s primary eyewear-sales competitors could be controlled by statute without violating the
federal constitution.”). As indicated in the text, before Heller it seemed likely that the last words in
the parenthetical quotation should actually have read “without inference by courts on federal
constitutional grounds.”
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 481, 559 n.326 (2004) (“[Williamson’s] deferential posture grew explicitly out of the shadow
of Lochner.”).
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owes the legislative function.121 The New Deal cure for the disease of
Lochner was to redraft, or redirect, constitutional doctrine so that courts
would, at least in most circumstances, give legislatures the widest
possible scope for their lawmaking decisions. As the Court put it, shortly
after the 1937 shift, “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle
of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”122
The extraordinarily deferential form of judicial review that the Court
employed in Williamson, and that it adheres to in modern rational-basis
cases such as Beach Communications,123 springs out of this prophylactic
or strategic intention. It is doctrine, crafted to prevent one constitutional
actor, the judiciary itself, from violating however innocently the
constitutional norms we collectively describe as the separation of
powers. The Court replaced a paradigm of judicial overreaching with
what Justice Thomas in Beach Communications termed “a paradigm of
judicial restraint.”124
1.

The Doctrinal Gap in Williamson

Where there is a doctrinal gap, judicial doctrine is, by definition,
either overenforcing or underenforcing an actual constitutional norm for
strategic reasons. In the context of Williamson there is, of course, no
possibility that the Court is following a rule that is more stringent than
the commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Williamson-style rational-basis review is virtually toothless.125 As soon
as one recalls the traditional, prophylactic justification for rational-basis
scrutiny, it becomes obvious that there probably is a doctrinal gap
between the Court’s deferential standard of review and the constitutional
principle (usually due process or equal protection) the Court is
enforcing. The justification of a need to respect the legislative function,
after all, does not speak in terms of the substance of those principles.

121. Whether this was entirely fair to the Justices associated with Lochner is beside the point for
present purposes: I shall use “Lochner” and “the New Deal [Court]” to stand, conventionally and
respectively, for the Court’s uneven protection of economic liberty prior to 1937 and its almost
complete retreat from such protection beginning in that year.
122. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510 (1937).
123. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993); see supra text accompanying note 57.
124. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 (1979)).
125. See, e.g., Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original Meaning, Historical
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585,
604 (1994) (describing Williamson as “employing a particularly toothless version of the rational
basis test”).
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Indeed, the constitutional commands that the Court’s justification
appears to have in view concern separation of powers and the negative
implications of the federal judiciary’s limitation to the exercise of the
“judicial power” in specifically enumerated cases and controversies. By
the Court’s own reasoning, then, it would be in a sense coincidental if
the self-restraint driven doctrine of deferential rational-basis scrutiny
produced the same operational rule as the substantive requirements of
due process and equal protection—and of course all the cases in which
the Court does not employ rational-basis review in implementing those
requirements make it seem very unlikely that there is such a coincidence.
The rational-basis test of Williamson is, as Dean Sager argued, most
likely an example of judicial underenforcement. We should not read
Justice Douglas’s opinion, therefore, as concluding that the legislation
under review—an unabashed exercise in rent-seeking without any
public-regarding purpose, as the district court (the trier of fact) found it
to be—actually treated similarly situated parties similarly, or restricted
the opticians’ liberty for some legitimate governmental purpose. All
Justice Douglas, or the Court, actually announced was that under the
judiciary’s limited form of review, self-imposed out of respect for the
legislature, the Court could not hold the statute unconstitutional. Justice
Douglas’s language suggested as much: “The prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. We
cannot say that that point has been reached here. . . . [f]or all this record
shows.”126 On this reading of his language, Justice Douglas deliberately
offered any judgment about whether the statute was unconstitutional in
principle, apart from judicial deference. It would be possible in theory to
conclude that the consequence of the Court’s strategic underenforcement
is simply to leave the constitutional question in principle unanswered.
But another rhetorical strand in the Court’s explanation for its deference
to the legislature implies that Dean Sager is right, and judicial
underenforcement triggers the legal obligation on the part of non-judicial
government officials “to obey an underenforced constitutional
norm . . . beyond its interpretation by the federal judiciary to the full
dimensions of the concept which the norm embodies.”127 For the New
Deal Court, Justice Holmes was an iconic figure, and the Justices of that
era were well aware that in addition to his general attitude of deference,
Holmes had written in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May128

126. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (emphasis added).
127. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227.
128. 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
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that “it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of
the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
courts.”129 As Sager himself noted in his article, the May passage
indicates that Holmes was an adherent to Sager’s thesis avant la lettre:
“Holmes, I think . . . meant quite literally that the legislatures were to be
regarded as guardians of the liberties of the people—including and
especially those enshrined in the Constitution—above the power of the
Supreme Court to enforce those same liberties.”130
It is plausible that Douglas and his colleagues in Williamson explicitly
thought that the gap between a less restrictive rational-basis doctrine and
a more restrictive constitutional command was supposed to be filled by
the legislature’s own conscientious respect for the command.131 The
Court expressly stated this expectation in a different doctrinal context at
the very dawn of its New Deal era. Discussing the Constitution’s
limitation of Congress’s spending power to expenditures for the general
welfare, Justice Cardozo wrote in 1937:
The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another,
between particular and general. Where this shall be placed
cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event.
There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which
discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not confided to
the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice
is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment. This is now familiar law.132
The norm that federal spending must serve the general welfare (or
common defense) is a constitutional command; the judgment of which
Cardozo wrote is a constitutional judgment as to the purpose and effect
of congressional expenditures and Congress’s discretion in enacting
spending legislation included the duty and authority to exercise its own
judgment on the fit between a spending bill and the constitutional norm.
One of the primary “constitutional restraints” insuring that Congress will
observe this norm, then-Justice Stone wrote in a slightly earlier case, is

129. Id. at 270. Justice Douglas quoted the Holmes passage in an opinion in United States v.
Enmon, 410 U.S. 396, 413 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227 n.48.
131. The relevant passage from Justice Holmes’s opinion in May appears in several opinions
written before Williamson by Justices who shared the New Deal rejection of Lochner. See United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 131 (1940) (majority opinion of Black, J.); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
87 (1936) (Stone, J., joined by Brandeis & Cardozo, JJ., dissenting).
132. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
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and the Executive”133
ought to be limited to
power.” Dean Sager’s
were orthodox for the

The Implications of Nonjudicial Constitutional Enforcement Under
the Facts of Williamson

Justice Douglas’s opinion in Williamson invites speculation about
how legislative implementation of an underenforced constitutional norm
might work. Imagine a state legislature debating whether to enact a law
materially the same as that upheld in Williamson, but in circumstances
where Holmes’s dictum about legislatures being ultimate guardians of
the liberties of the people was a live part of legislative discussion. One
potential topic for deliberation would be the constitutionality under the
Equal Protection Clause of dividing businesses factually able to fit
lenses into new frames into ophthalmologists and optometrists (who
could do so without referring the customer to a different business for a
required prescription) and opticians (who could not). Williamson would
make it clear to the legislators that the courts would not invalidate
legislation making such a distinction, but that would not be the end of
the constitutional discussion. Precisely because the judiciary would
defer to the legislature’s decision, conscientious legislators would find it
necessary to determine whether the distinction violates equal protection
for themselves, as a matter of their own constitutional judgment and not
as a prediction or anticipation of what would happen in court.134
Looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law not to predict the
judiciary’s actions but to discern the actual constitutional norm, a
representative might reason that the underlying norm applicable to his or
her lawmaking actions in principle is something like the following:
“[T]he classification ‘must rest upon some ground of difference having a
133. Butler, 297 U.S. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis and Cardozo joined the
dissent, which went on vigorously to reject “any assumption that the responsibility for the
preservation of our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of
government . . . .” Id. at 87–88.
134. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227 (“This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their
unenforced margins requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these norms
and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions. Public officials cannot consider
themselves free to act at what they perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms
merely because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their margins. At a
minimum, the obligation of public officials in this context, as in any other, is one of ‘best efforts’ to
avoid unconstitutional conduct.”)
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fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,’” or (put
differently) must “rest[] upon some reasonable consideration of
difference or policy . . . .”135 Given factual evidence of the sort presented
to the Williamson district court, legislators might ask questions about the
public benefit served by the law, and the fairness and policy of
excluding opticians from performing services they can provide without
obvious public detriment.
We need not indulge an unrealistic romanticism about politicians to
see potential practical value from such questions in addition to the
intrinsic rule of law value in public officials acting in accordance with
their legal duties.136 In some situations, constitutional doubts might in
fact lead to the defeat of egregious rent-seeking and other substantively
indefensible bills; in others constitutional opposition to a proposed law
might lead to improvements in the legislation, or create a legislative
record making popular repudiation of or judicial intervention against
improvident or special-interest laws more likely.
The Constitution does not, of course, guarantee that legislatures will
make no mistakes or even that they will avoid giving in to political
pressure. At the same time, as our tradition has interpreted equal
protection and due process for a very long time, it does guarantee that
there are significant limits to the extent to which classifications can
serve selfish concerns or liberty can be impaired without some
discernible benefit to the common good. If, as Justice Holmes wrote,
“legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the courts,”137 the consideration of
constitutional issues concerning those liberties is an intrinsic part of the
legislative function, and Dean Sager’s thesis, that the legislature has a
special responsibility where the federal courts cannot guard
constitutional liberty, seems very persuasive.

135. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (citations omitted) (quoting F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217
U.S. 563, 573 (1910)). But see U.S.R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174–77 (1980) (discussing
variations in the Court’s formulation of the rational-basis test).
136. The Court has observed that an inquiry into the relation between the legislature’s goals and
its use of classifications is of value to the legislative process. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
632 (1996) (“The search for the link between classification and objective gives substance to the
Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to
know what sorts of laws it can pass . . . .”).
137. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
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HELLER’S FOOTNOTE 27 REPRESENTS A REJECTION OF
THE STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING OF RATIONAL-BASIS
SCRUTINY

Footnote 27 in Heller overturns the traditional understanding of
rational-basis review as described above. According to Justice Scalia,
the rational-basis test is not a strategic doctrine, designed to avoid
judicial interference with the “rightful independence and . . . ability to
function”138 of “the legislative branch,”139 as the Court has so often
indicated.140 At least with respect to equal protection (and there is no
reason to doubt that he meant to include due process as well),141 the
footnote indicates that rational-basis inquiry does not underenforce the
Constitution’s actual commands, as Dean Sager thought. Indeed, the
rational-basis test is not really judicially crafted doctrine at all, but a
straightforward restatement of the constitutional norms at issue:
“rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves
prohibitions on irrational laws. In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just
the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional
guarantee.”142 There is no doctrinal gap: the Court enforces the entirety
of the constitutional guarantee, which itself extends only to prohibiting
“irrational laws.”
We are now in a position to see why footnote 27 is potentially so
important. First, the footnote annuls all the oft-repeated language, from
the May case in 1903 to Beach Communications in 1993, describing
rational basis as grounded in judicial respect for the legislature and
legislative judgment. By deferring to any rational ground for the
legislature’s decision, rather than deciding itself whether the
classification or invasion of liberty was reasonable, the judiciary ensures
that it does not tread on legislative turf. Taken at face value, footnote 27
flatly rejects this familiar argument.
First, according to the footnote, the Court’s application of rational
basis is not—or at any rate should not be—a strategic act of deference to
138. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973)).
139. Id.
140. See Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365; Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510
(1937).
141. The Court sometimes uses the language of rational basis in other areas of constitutional law.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (Commerce Clause). It is clear that Justice Scalia
did not have those uses of the terminology in mind in writing footnote 27.
142. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citation omitted).
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a legislature. According to footnote 27, the Court upholds laws with
flimsy or ex post facto rationales, with glaring inadequacies in the
connection between asserted goals and actual means, even with as
undisguised an unsavory motive as the district court thought apparent in
Williamson.143 This suggests that the sharp limitations on rational-basis
scrutiny are not because the Court needs to leave a broad scope for the
exercise of legislative discretion, or out of the Court’s respect for the
superior fact-finding or policy-making abilities or responsibilities of the
legislature. The judicial decision is directly mandated by the
Constitution because the Constitution itself permits such laws. From the
perspective announced by footnote 27, it may be true that the
consequence of the Court enforcing all that the Constitution requires and
nothing more is to leave room for legislative discretion and all the rest.
But that consequence is not the reason, or even a reason, for the Court’s
flaccid level of scrutiny. The explanation of the latter is that rational
basis is “the very substance of the constitutional guarantee,” and that as
a result there is nothing else for the Court to enforce. Apparent
statements to the contrary from Justice Holmes to Justice Thomas were
all mistakes.
Second, the footnote is enormously suggestive with respect to existing
rational-basis precedents. The reader will recall the role that the
existence of a doctrinal gap plays in constitutional stare decisis: a
doctrine that is understood, explicitly or not, to incorporate a strategic
element is in a sense more vulnerable. A Justice can repudiate his or her
adherence to it without admitting to a serious error in the interpretation
of the Constitution itself. Justice Scalia’s abandonment of the
congruence and proportionality test for congressional legislation under
the Fourteenth Amendment is a good example.144
On the other hand, if there is little or no distance between the test the
Court applies and the actual command of the Constitution, precedent
applying the test is itself more straightforwardly right or wrong, a correct
application of the Constitution or a flat misconstruction of it. According
to footnote 27, the latter is the case with rational-basis precedents: those
cases are direct applications of “the very substance of the constitutional
guarantee” prohibiting “irrational laws.” There can be in principle no
laws that the Court upheld—or at least that it should have upheld—that
are “irrational” in the constitutional sense—whatever Justice Scalia
means by “irrational,” an issue to which we shall eventually turn. Unless

143. See supra Part IV.C.
144. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
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the Court decided Williamson v. Lee Optical incorrectly, the law there,
on the facts as found by the district court, satisfies the Constitution’s
guarantees concerning equal protection and due process. Conversely,
cases in which the Court invalidated a law using rational-basis scrutiny
were mistakes if the laws in question were not, constitutionally,
irrational.
Footnote 27 could be, therefore, a powerful tool for sorting out the
Court’s rational-basis case law, a body of decisions that, on any fair
reckoning, is in a fair state of disarray.145 If the Court is to accept any
form of stare decisis, the mere fact that a later Justice thinks a decision
wrong in principle does not require departure from it, but identifying
error in the basis for the decision is cause for reconsideration of the
precedential status of a decision. There is one set of rational-basis
precedents where footnote 27 suggests reconsideration is in order, even
without delving into the precise meaning of “irrational”: the small and
motley set of cases in which the Court invalidated a law not because the
law was literally without reason, but because the Court held the
government’s reasons to be bad ones.146 These decisions are opaque
because it is hard to explain why the Court looks behind the ex post
facto rationalizations it usually swallows.
On an underenforcement understanding of rational-basis scrutiny,
however, the decisions make perfect sense in substance. It is always the
law of the Constitution that bad purposes render a classification (or a
restriction on liberty) unconstitutional: constitutional rationality requires
not only that the official action make sense as a means toward some
governmental end but that the end itself be legitimate, which is a
normative judgment.147 As the Court observed in an opinion joined by
145. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Assoc. of Univ. Profs., 526 U.S. 124, 132–33 & n.3
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing implications of fact that “[c]ases applying the rationalbasis test have described that standard in various ways” that are inconsistent).
146. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (state interest in enforcing
majority’s moral views insufficient); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (as-applied decision); Williams v. Vermont, 472
U.S. 14, 22–24 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 227–30 (1982); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–35 (1973); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968). This list is neither exhaustive nor indisputable: the Court is
not always clear what standard it is applying.
147. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (noting as a statement of an
“unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence” an
earlier statement that “negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable . . . are not permissible bases” for governmental discrimination (quoting Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 448)); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S.
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Justice Scalia, under “the usual rational-basis test: if a statute is not
rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be
saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to an
illegitimate governmental interest.”148
Most of the time, the value of judicial deference in preventing judicial
overreaching makes it inappropriate for the courts to engage in the sort
of intrusive review of legislative action necessary to catch legislation
with bad purposes. But when a court, as it were, stumbles across a bad
legislative purpose, no strategic purpose would be served in ignoring the
fact, and it becomes the court’s constitutional duty to invalidate the law.
The mistake the district court judges made in Williamson was that the
scrutiny they applied to the handiwork of the Oklahoma Legislature was
insufficiently respectful of the latter’s constitutional dignity and role. On
the constitutional merits, the district court may have been entirely
correct. In contrast, from the perspective advanced by footnote 27, the
district court judges in Williamson were simply wrong in principle if the
Oklahoma law was not “irrational” constitutionally—or they were right
and the U.S. Supreme Court made a mistake in reversing them. The badpurpose cases in which the High Court has invalidated official decisions
on that ground were right only if those actions were irrational in a sense
that the many laws and other actions the Court has upheld were not.
Justice Scalia’s underlying logic in footnote 27 leads to the conclusion
that the bad-purpose cases were all mistakes, because the category of

at 534)); Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at
533–34); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (“[S]ome objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,’—are not legitimate state interests.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979) (noting
“classifications drawn ‘with an evil eye and an unequal hand’ or motivated by ‘a feeling of
antipathy’ against, a specific group” violate equal protection (citations omitted) (quoting Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886)); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975) (stating
that “of course Congress may not invidiously discriminate . . . on the basis of a ‘bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group’” but must use “criteria” that have a rational relation to
a “legitimate legislative goal” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. In
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 593 n.40, the Court traced the requirement of a legitimate governmental purpose
back to Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884). See Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32 (holding that equal
protection prohibits “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others,” but
permits “legislation which [] carr[ies] out a public purpose”).
148. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 370 n.8. My point is not to criticize Justice Scalia for inconsistency (Lyng
was long ago and decided early in his time on the Court), but to underline the ordinary and (one
would have thought) uncontroversial nature of the proposition that constitutional rationality, which
requires at least the hypothetical presence of a “legitimate” governmental interest or purpose, has a
normative component. The Court has not treated public rationality as limited to a mere logical
connection between means and ends.
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“irrational laws” does not encompass them. In any event, without further
explanation they are even more anomalous than before.
Third, footnote 27 entirely collapses Dean Sager’s underenforcement
thesis with respect to rational-basis scrutiny. In doing so, it eviscerates
the corollary he drew of a constitutional duty on the part of other
governmental officials to implement constitutional norms that judicial
doctrine left underenforced for strategic reasons. It would be quite
wrong for a legislator to oppose a Williamson-like bill on the ground that
the legislator thought it violated equal protection, at least along the lines
outlined earlier, or for that matter for a governor to veto the bill because
the governor similarly thought it unconstitutional. If the bill would pass
judicial rational-basis scrutiny, then there is no federal constitutional
argument that it is nevertheless a violation of equal protection, because
the whole substance of equal protection is a prohibition on irrational
laws, and irrational laws are those that fail rational-basis examination. In
the world of footnote 27, there is no normative gap between
constitutional command and judicial doctrine that is to be filled, or even
can be filled, by the conscientious application of constitutional norms by
non-judicial officials. Footnote 27 leaves the domain of politics wider, in
the sense that under it fewer possible laws would be unconstitutional in
principle. But it does so by making the domain of politics much
narrower in another way, stripped of any special role in constitutional
implementation.
Implicit in footnote 27 is a vision of the relationship between politics
and the Constitution that we have already considered: the Constitution as
analogue to the Internal Revenue Code, with the political branches of
government in the position of taxpayers “obligated” to obey the
Constitution only in the sense of being subject to external sanctions for
violations of the rules that the external authority (the courts in the case
of the Constitution) enforces.149 For Justice Scalia, presumably, this is
the arrangement that the Constitution itself ordains and that American
constitutional practice has traditionally respected. This arrangement is,
however, demonstrably in error about the tradition. Whether he is
nevertheless right about what the Constitution ordains when it is
properly interpreted depends on other considerations. As the Court noted
in City of Boerne, Madison argued in the First Congress that “it is
incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the
Government as to any other, that the constitution should be preserved

149. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
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entire. It is our duty.”150 From Madison’s perspective, which is surely
correct, the implementation of the Constitution is “the province and
duty” of the political branches just as much as it is that of the judiciary,
even if they carry out that responsibility through different means and,
generally, with respect for the finality of judicial decisions. By drawing
a sharp line between the domain of political freedom and the domain of
constitutional principle, footnote 27 undermines Madison’s principle.151
There is a fourth way in which footnote 27 is potentially farreaching, although it is not as clear as with the first three points that this
implication is fairly attributable to the footnote. As noted earlier, Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Dickerson appeared to reject altogether the legitimacy
of judge-made doctrine that imposes stricter limitations on political
action than the Constitution’s norms necessarily require, “in the sense”
(as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote) “that nothing else will suffice to
satisfy constitutional requirements.”152 Footnote 27 does not address
strategic, overenforcing or prophylactic judicial doctrine, of course, and
Justice Scalia has written or joined opinions in cases besides Dickerson
that appear to take a somewhat less draconian position on overenforcing
doctrines. Nevertheless, putting the Dickerson dissent (no overenforcing doctrine) together with footnote 27 (rational basis, the usual
paradigm of an underenforcing doctrine, is nonetheless not an
underenforcing doctrine) suggests a consistent, if intellectually radical,
perspective: all constitutional doctrine is, in principle, illegitimate.
On its face, judicial overenforcement, which narrows political action
more than the Constitution does per se, is quite different from judicial
underenforcement, which expands the range of possible political
150. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 521, 535 (1997) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500
(1789)); supra text accompanying note 98.
151. I should note an ostensible exception. Justice Scalia appears to think, rightly I believe, that at
least some of the time, a decision that an issue poses a non-justiciable political question means not
that there is no legal rule applicable, but that the Constitution leaves the implementation of the rule
to a non-judicial actor. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion of
Scalia, J.) (“Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no business
entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political
branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”); id. at 292 (“The issue we have discussed is
not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). This exception is partial as well as
rare: application of the political question doctrine means only that some non-judicial decisionmaker
has some small area of responsibility for making law-like decisions in addition to its usual, political
role.
152. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (majority opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.), with id. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting what he described as “the power of
the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on Congress
and the States”).
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decisions. Both however are strategic in nature and create a doctrinal gap
between judicial decision and constitutional command. Furthermore,
when adopted deliberately, both over- and underenforcement depend on
an understanding of constitutional law that is inconsistent with the
existence of a sharp-edged distinction between constitutional and
political decisions. Underenforcement presupposes political-branch
constitutional implementation while overenforcement assumes the
legitimacy of judicial decisions that involve strategic considerations that
are, at least in a broad sense, political in nature. Justice Scalia’s extrajudicial writings strongly suggest that that he views all judicial doctrine
in constitutional matters as illegitimate. The Constitution, he appears to
think, consists of rules, constitutional law should implement those rules,
no more and no less, and all the rest of governmental action is subject to
what we might call “aconstitutional” political decisionmaking—political
choice unconstrained by constitutional considerations outside the
judicially enforced rules.153 This view is, perhaps, a theoretically
defensible position, and as a verbal matter at least, it has an illustrious
pedigree.154
But it clearly does not represent the mainstream of American
constitutional thought or practice, which is resolutely doctrinal.155 There
is nothing surprising about finding Justice Scalia taking a radical stance
toward some feature of contemporary constitutional law that he thinks
153. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–41 (1997); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989).
154. Thomas Jefferson sometimes made statements that sound as if he was an adherent to a form
of constitutional literalism. See, for example, his famous letter to Wilson C. Nicholas: “Our peculiar
security is in possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.”
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 247 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897); see also H.
Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689
(1994) (discussing the role of textualism in Jeffersonian constitutionalism). In a more recent era,
Justice Black’s self-professed literalism comes immediately to mind.
155. See generally CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS (2004), which is an elegant
account of and (in the main) apology for contemporary constitutional doctrine. Professor (and
former Justice) Fried puts the inevitability of doctrine more strongly: “The Constitution’s text must
be mediated by doctrine before it can yield decision.” Id. at 3. There may also be areas of justiciable
constitutional controversy where the underlying norm can be implemented rather directly. See, e.g.,
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF
AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 300–01 (2009) (defending an absolutist approach to free speech
protection under the First Amendment). As a general matter, however, I think that anti-doctrinalism
in the name of the constitutional text has been more a rhetorical trope (and a powerful one) for its
most prominent proponents. See id. at 239–60 (reading Justice Black’s First Amendment absolutism
as based in fact on a structural vision of constitutional institutions rather than simply on the words
of the provision); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 11–21 (2003)
(discussing an example of Jefferson going beyond the text in answering a constitutional question).
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wayward,156 but institutions tend to be conservative with respect to their
practices. Whatever Justice Scalia may think, it does not follow that the
rest of the Justices in the Heller majority intended to endorse a position
that is, at most, only partially to be found in one of its footnotes, and that
would mark a sea change from their existing practices. But nothing
proves that they, or most of them, do not,157 and in any event the
language in U.S. Supreme Court opinions takes on a life of its own, with
consequences that are not delimited by the intentions of those who write
them or join them.158
If footnote 27 proves to advance any of these four implications, it will
turn out to be highly significant. There is yet another aspect of the
footnote, which is still more important, although at a more fundamental
level. According to the footnote, when the Court uses rational-basis
scrutiny in enforcing constitutional “guarantees”—in implementing
equal protection and substantive due process, at the least—the form of
the Court’s scrutiny is conceptually identical to the substance of the
constitutional guarantee itself. Rational basis is the test when the
constitutional command is a prohibition on irrationality in government
action. In Justice Scalia’s view, only the irrational, as such, is the
Constitution’s concern when the norms of equal protection and
substantive due process are invoked, at least in the vast majority of cases
where government treats someone differently than it does others, or

156. Justice Scalia’s frequent invocation of tradition as a feature of constitutional thought, and
perhaps the sense that he is, in the evening-news sense, a “conservative,” together tend to obscure
the fact that he often takes intellectually radical positions on legal and constitutional issues. Patrick
Brennan’s analysis of Justice Scalia’s overall constitutional approach, which Brennan calls “Scalia’s
bid for radical reform,” is especially insightful. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating Authority
in Law, and Avoiding the Authoritarianism of “Textualism,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 761, 797
(2008). The impulse to radical reform is a recurrent and, overall, beneficial element in American
legal change and to observe that someone is taking a radical position in (or on) the law is not
thereby to criticize him or her but only to identify the relationship of his or her position to those
generally accepted, at the time or historically.
157. Justice Kennedy is the only Justice who joined the opinion of the Court in Dickerson who
was also on the Court and in the majority in Heller. On the basis of Dickerson alone, it is hard to see
how he could subscribe to the anti-doctrine approach to constitutional law that I believe Justice
Scalia implied in footnote 27. As Justice Kennedy’s opinions in City of Boerne and Croson show,
he does not oppose the overt consideration of strategic factors in shaping doctrine. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
158. As Professor Schauer pointed out years ago, the language of the Court’s opinions has an
authoritative life of its own. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 684
(1986) (“[T]he words of an opinion take on a canonical role not unlike that played by the words in a
statute . . . .”).
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restricts someone’s liberty.159 This is a very different explanation of the
test than the strategic rationale that the Court has ordinarily invoked
since 1937.160 If footnote 27 is adopted more broadly, courts would ask
only whether a law or other governmental action is sheerly irrational as a
logical matter, because under the footnote it is only sheer illogic that
violates the Constitution, and rational-basis scrutiny is not a means of
according deference to a political actor who may properly have an
independent view of what makes sense in terms of classification or
regulation. Footnote 27 invites the reader to wonder what exactly is the
concept of rationality or irrationality that the footnote identifies as “the
very substance” of two of the Constitution’s central commands.
Fortunately, the footnote, although brief, gives a big clue as to what
Justice Scalia means. We now turn to deciphering what he is telling us.
VI. FOOTNOTE 27 EMBODIES CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION’S
REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY
Ambiguity is a potent source of confusion in constitutional law, and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s references to the irrational and its opposite
often leave the reader uncertain of the Court’s exact meaning. In the case
of footnote 27, however, Justice Scalia provides a direct and extremely
useful clue to his view: a citation to an opinion of the Court written by
Chief Justice Roberts, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture. In
Engquist, the Chief Justice provided an unusually clear explanation of
how he understood the concept of rationality in equal protection
analysis. Footnote 27’s citation appears to incorporate that explanation
in the footnote’s assertion about the meaning of constitutional
irrationality. Ostensibly, that explanation is the understanding footnote
27 is meant to incorporate.
A.

Engquist Is a Paradigm for the “Irrational”

Here, again, is the relevant part of footnote 27, with a citation
restored:
But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used
when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are

159. Again, rational-basis scrutiny is the default test under both rubrics. Justice Scalia is, if
anything, in favor of expanding the range of circumstances in which the Court applies rational basis
rather than some other form of heightened scrutiny.
160. See supra Part IV.C.
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themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. See, e.g., Engquist v.
Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. —, —, 128 S. Ct. 2146,
2153–2154 (2008). In those cases, “rational basis” is not just the
standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional
guarantee.161
Engquist, which the Court decided seventeen days before Heller, is one
of “those cases” that illustrate the “very substance of the constitutional
guarantee.” It is, consequently, a key to footnote 27’s interpretation of
the Constitution’s ordinary or default norms with respect to substantive
due process and equal protection.
Engquist was brought by a former state government employee who
claimed that her discharge was unlawful for various reasons, among
them an allegation that she was fired for “arbitrary, vindictive, and
malicious reasons” (essentially personal animus), quite apart from
animus toward her sex, race, and national origin, which she also
alleged.162 This allegation, Engquist argued, stated an equal protection
class-of-one claim.163 The district court agreed, and she won a jury
award based in part on the allegation, but the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the class-of-one theory of equal protection liability does not
apply to public employers.164 The theory, which the Court recognized as
cognizable in an earlier decision, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,165
identifies an equal protection problem in situations where government
singles out an individual for arbitrary treatment not because of his
membership in an identifiable class such as race or sex, but on his own,
as the unique object of official disfavor.166 Relying on cases stressing the
government’s special role as an employer, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the “class-of-one theory” was inapplicable in that context.167 Other
federal courts of appeals had sustained class-of-one claims in cases
arising out of public employment, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split among the circuits.168
161. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
162. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 595 (2008) (quoting Engquist’s complaint).
163. Id.
164. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007).
165. 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
166. See, e.g., Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602 (“[W]hen it appears that an individual is being singled
out by the government, the specter of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal
Protection Clause requires a ‘rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” (quoting Olech, 528
U.S. at 564)).
167. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994–96.
168. See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006); Whiting v. Univ.
of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 348–50 (5th Cir. 2006); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470
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The high Court affirmed the decision below, holding that the class-ofone theory should not be allowed in challenges to governmental
decisions involving public employees.169 Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the six-Justice majority, identified a two-part reason for that
conclusion: one, the Court’s “traditional view of the core concern of the
Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications” and,
two, the “unique considerations applicable when the government acts as
employer as opposed to sovereign.”170 By “traditional view,” Chief
Justice Roberts meant that equal protection claims usually arise when
government “‘create[s] discrete and objectively identifiable classes’” as
the basis for its discrimination.171 In contrast, the use of class-based
decisionmaking to subject individuals to discriminatory treatment poses
the danger of arbitrary distinction between similarly situated
individuals—what Chief Justice Roberts calls “the specter of arbitrary
classification.”172 In “traditional” analytical terms, therefore, a “class of
one” is a figure of speech, but Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
class-of-one theory that Olech accepted was “an application of”
traditional principle rather than “a departure from” it, because in Olech,
and the cases on which Olech relied, there was “a clear standard [for the
government action] against which departures, even for a single plaintiff,
could be readily assessed.”173
In contrast, in the context of government employment, the Chief
Justice reasoned, there is no objective standard by which to determine if
the government has acted arbitrarily, “for employment decisions are
quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of
factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify.”174 The Chief Justice
continued:
To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way
that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to
exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the
employer-employee relationship. A challenge that one has been

F.3d 250, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2006); Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005);
Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2005); Campagna v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 334 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2003).
169. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 609.
170. Id. at 598.
171. Id. at 601 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
172. Id. at 602.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 604.
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treated individually in this context, instead of like everyone else,
is a challenge to the underlying nature of the government
action.175
In other words, subjective and individualized decisions, which Chief
Justice Roberts identified as within the exercise of broad discretion,
simply cannot be cabined even by a requirement that they be rational.
For this reason, the class-of-one theory is “a poor fit in the public
employment context,” and the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
equal protection claims such as Engquist’s are not cognizable.176 “In
such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out
of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such
state officials are entrusted to exercise.”177
It is easy to imagine reading the Court’s holding in Engquist as a
strategic decision, intended to keep the judiciary out of an area in which
it would be extremely difficult for courts to vindicate the constitutional
norm without undue interference in the functioning of the political
branches. Without a “clear standard” to apply to personnel decisions,
courts would find themselves simply second-guessing the executive or
administrative officials who made the decisions on a discretionary basis
in the first place, thereby “undermin[ing] the very discretion that such
state officials are entrusted to exercise.”178 The point of Engquist, on this
reading, would not be that government is constitutionally free to make
employment decisions based on whim or animus toward an individual
employee, but rather that given the difficulty of ascertaining or even
articulating the basis for many such decisions, it is preferable for the
courts to abstain. Such deliberate judicial underenforcement would leave
implementation of the norm to the political branches, not decree that
what would be an illegitimate basis for governmental action in any other
circumstance is constitutionally acceptable in government personnel
decisions.
Footnote 27 of Heller, however, clearly rejects a strategic or doctrinal
interpretation of Engquist. Rather, Justice Scalia’s view of Engquist in
footnote 27 is also the more natural reading of Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion standing on its own.179 According to footnote 27, Engquist
175. Id. at 605.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 603. It is worth noting that the Court expressly reaffirmed the continuing viability of
class-based claims about government employment decisions. Id. at 605.
178. Id. at 603.
179. There is language that could support a strategic understanding of Engquist, and without
footnote 27 one might not be quite sure how to read the decision. See, for example, id. at 604, where
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applied “the very substance of the equal protection guarantee”—a
prohibition on “irrational laws”—in holding that the plaintiff’s
allegations did not state an equal protection claim.180 Those allegations,
in other words, did not describe a constitutionally cognizable form of
irrational government action. That is, on its face, a surprising
proposition.181 The plaintiff in Engquist alleged that “she was fired . . .
for ‘arbitrary, vindictive and malicious reasons.’”182 In class-based equal
protection cases, if the government’s purpose is to harm the disfavored
group for such reasons, its action is invalid under rational-basis scrutiny,
because that test asks whether the classification in question serves a
legitimate governmental purpose, not simply some purpose.183
Given the judicial willingness to entertain hypothetical and even
implausible explanations for the government’s actions,184 it is very
difficult in a rational-basis case for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of
governmental purpose-to-harm, but that is a difficulty of proof and does
not affect the underlying constitutional norm. Furthermore, in light of
Olech’s recognition of the class-of-one theory, which Engquist did not
question, it seems implausible to assert that it can be a legitimate
governmental purpose to single out an individual for harm for “arbitrary,
vindictive, and malicious reasons” peculiar to that individual. Such a
the opinion’s reference to treating “seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the
employment context” at least allows the inference that the problem lies in the difficulty of judging
decisions necessarily based in part on subjective or non-quantifiable factors (emphasis added).
However, given the close temporal proximity between Engquist and Heller, and the fact that the two
Justices joined one another’s opinions, there is no reason to think that Justice Scalia misunderstood
the Chief Justice’s slightly earlier opinion.
180. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
181. It is, for constitutional purposes, immaterial in itself that Engquist involved an
administrative decision rather than a law or other general rule. As the Chief Justice noted,
administrators are just as surely governed by equal protection as legislators. 553 U.S. at 597. It is a
familiar and very old feature of equal protection law, furthermore, that particular government
decisions that violate the equal protection norm are unconstitutional even if the law under which
they were taken is itself constitutional. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
The Constitution demands that equal protection be afforded not only by the rule governing a public
decision but by decision itself as well.
182. 553 U.S. at 595 (quoting Joint Appendix at 10, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S.
591 (2008) (No. 07-474)).
183. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (“[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest. As a result, ‘[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in
and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest,
justify [a government action].’” (second and third alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972))).
184. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); supra Part IV.C.
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purpose is indistinguishable from the invidious race- or gender-based
animus that clearly is impermissible under equal protection.185
Despite all this, Engquist held that, in the area of government
employment, equal protection does not prohibit decisions that would be
constitutionally impermissible elsewhere: the constitutional “rule that
people should be ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions’
is not violated when one person is treated differently from others” in the
context of “an individualized, subjective personnel decision.”186 Such a
decision cannot transgress the equal protection norm, even when it is, ex
hypothesi, an “arbitrary or irrational” decision.187 Equal protection
simply has no application to such decisions including those situations in
which they are made “in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner.”188
The unavoidable implication is that the Constitution puts no equal
protection constraint on the power of government to “treat[] an
employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at
all,” at least if it does not make use of a group-based classification in
doing so.189

185. The Court asserted in Olech that “the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal
protection analysis.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 n.* (2000). In order to avoid
the risk that recognizing the class-of-one theory would convert many garden-variety disputes over
governmental decisions into constitutional cases (an overtly strategic reason), Justice Breyer
thought it crucial that the plaintiff in Olech had alleged that the governmental defendants had acted
out of “‘vindictive [motives],’ ‘illegitimate animus,’ or ‘ill will.’” Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Court declined to
include that as a requirement to state a class-of-one claim, but it clearly accepted the plaintiff’s
allegation along those lines as adequately alleging that the government had “no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
186. 553 U.S. at 603, 605 (emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71–72
(1887)).
187. Id. at 605.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 606. The quoted language is the opinion’s summary of the at-will employment
doctrine. The Chief Justice apparently assumed that a constitutional argument entailing modification
of that common-law doctrine would be questionable on that ground alone. See id. (“The
Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine.”). His assumption is puzzling.
There is no plausible argument that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment presuppose the
doctrine’s application to government employees, because the doctrine did not become the general
American rule until after 1868. See, e.g., Andrew P. Moriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 699 (1994)
(explaining that only three states adopted the doctrine before 1870 and none before 1808). The
supposed “historical understanding of the nature of government employment,” Engquist, 553 U.S. at
606, is an innovation post-dating the constitutional provision at issue.
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Engquist Creates a Novel Definition of Irrationality

This conclusion poses an immediate puzzle: Engquist apparently
sanctions arbitrary or irrational personnel decisions as consistent with
equal protection, while footnote 27 identifies the prohibition of
“irrational laws” as the very substance of norms such as equal
protection. If, as Chief Justice Roberts clearly affirms, the individual
right to equal protection is offended by arbitrary or irrational
treatment—which must mean arbitrary or irrational treatment of the
individual—how can he also write that the Constitution permits
government to make individual personnel decisions that are “seemingly
arbitrary or irrational”? The Engquist opinion offers a hypothetical to
address this puzzle:190
Suppose, for example, that a traffic officer is stationed on a busy
highway where people often drive above the speed limit, and
there is no basis upon which to distinguish them. If the officer
gives only one of those people a ticket, it may be good English
to say that the officer has created a class of people that did not
get speeding tickets, and a “class of one” that did. But assuming
that it is in the nature of the particular government activity that
not all speeders can be stopped and ticketed, complaining that
one has been singled out for no reason does not invoke the fear
of improper government classification. Such a complaint, rather,
challenges the legitimacy of the underlying action itself-the
decision to ticket speeders under such circumstances. Of course,
an allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of
race or sex would state an equal protection claim, because such
discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal protection
concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground
that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for
no discernible or articulable reason, would be incompatible with
the discretion inherent in the challenged action. It is no proper

190. The Engquist hypothetical is similar to a hypothetical Judge Posner used in a pre-Engquist
Seventh Circuit case, Bell v. Duperrault:
A police car is lurking on the shoulder of a highway in a 45 m.p.h. zone, a car streaks by at 65
m.p.h., and the police do nothing. Two minutes later a car streaks by at 60 m.p.h. and the
police give that driver a ticket. Is it a denial of equal protection if the police cannot come up
with a rational explanation for why they ticketed the slower speeder?
367 F.3d 703, 712 (2004) (Posner, J., concurring). Posner, like Justice Breyer in Olech, would limit
class-of-one equal-protection claims to those in which the plaintiff alleges that the official action
was “invidiously motivated,” which he later explained to mean an intentional act of “vicious or
exploitative discrimination.” Id.
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challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized
decision that it was subjective and individualized.191
On its face, this hypothetical might seem to create more problems
than it solves.192 What is the constitutional difference between being
singled out for no reason and being singled out on the basis of race or
sex? Why does the officer’s decision which driver to ticket allegedly on
the basis of the driver’s race or sex probably violate equal protection,
while his decision to do so allegedly out of personal animus (recognizing
an old personal enemy, the officer decided to get even a little) raises no
equal protection concerns at all?193 The Chief Justice’s frequent
descriptions of the decisions in Engquist’s case and his traffic-officer
hypothetical as “individualized,”194 paired with his references to the
Court’s “traditional view of the core concern of the Equal Protection
Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications,”195 suggest one
answer. Together, one might read these passages to imply that there is
something especially problematic from an equal protection perspective
about governmental thinking that uses conceptual groupings of people to
make decisions. The only problem with this answer is that it cannot be
what the Engquist opinion means if the opinion is to make good sense.
There is no escape, in a governmental system based on the rule of
law, from the use of classifications, and a great many possible
classifications make perfectly good sense, even though they are applied

191. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04.
192. In dissent, Justice Stevens countered that under the circumstances hypothesized, the traffic
officer’s decision to ticket a single driver would be perfectly rational: “His inability to arrest every
driver in sight provides an adequate justification for making a random choice from a group of
equally guilty and equally accessible violators. . . . [A] random choice among rational alternatives
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 613. That seems correct, but I do not think it
identifies the most fundamental problem with the Chief Justice’s argument.
193. Proving a race- or sex-based invidious intention, in an isolated instance, might be just as
difficult as proving personal animus (or even harder), and race and sex are no more, and no less,
related to any reason for choosing which driver to pull over than a private history of enmity. Race,
of course, is of special equal protection concern because of constitutional history, and one might
think the same of sex, at least by analogy. But if that were the answer, the Chief Justice would have
had no explanation why class-of-one claims are cognizable in cases such as Olech (where there is
no historical or originalist argument for special solicitude), but not in Engquist. More generally, it
would be quite possible to build an understanding of equal protection law as built on the originalist
proposition that the paradigm case underlying the Fourteenth Amendment clause concerned
discrimination against African Americans as a grouping of people. Equal protection would then
apply to other discriminations by analogy and to the extent that the non-originalist situation is
analogous. Engquist makes no use of any such argument. Nor does footnote 27. On the concept of
the paradigm case, see JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15–18, 120–24 (2005).
194. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–05.
195. Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
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to particular persons in particular situations. Neither the presence of a
class larger than one in official decisionmaking, nor the fact that the
decision bears on an individual, can in itself make any constitutional
difference. A decision to fire a particular employee, or ticket a particular
driver, because of her race or sex—either of which, Chief Justice
Roberts affirms, would raise very serious equal protection concerns—is
just as “individualized” as a decision to fire or ticket her for no reason or
because of personal dislike. Of course, the use of a broad classification
(e.g., African American or female) to make decisions about an
individual may indicate or even prove that the decision in question fails
to provide any good reason for treating the individual differently than
others. However, the invidious use of race or sex does not make the
decision any more irrational than reaching the same result for no reason
or because the decisionmaker is acting out of personal ill will. If, as
Engquist implies, the overarching concern of equal protection is
irrationality—a governmental failure to act in a fashion that logically
advances “‘[some independent] consideration[] in the public
interest”196—race and sex as irrational motivations for governmental
action are no different in kind from simple official ill will, even though
they may be more frequent and the offenders more heinous.
The difference between class-based decisions and other
individualized decisions does not provide a conceptual justification for
the distinction Engquist attempts to draw. Furthermore, the effort seems
to fly in the face of existing constitutional understandings. It is settled
law that the equal protection right belongs to individuals, not to
groups.197 It is equally settled that a classification that serves no
purpose—“a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake”198 as
the Court has put it—or the illegitimate purpose of harming people has
no rational basis.199 Olech, unquestioned in Engquist, established the law
that it does not matter constitutionally how many people are affected
negatively by a discriminatory decision.200 Assuming that the decision in
Engquist does not upset one or more of these propositions, which the
majority opinion denies it has done, the category of “improper
government classifications” still encompasses those that have no
196. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)).
197. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups” (emphasis in original)).
198. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
199. Id. at 634–35.
200. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 n.* (2000).
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purpose, those that have a well-known and established bad purpose
(unjustified decisions based on race or sex), and those that have a bad
purpose peculiar to the particular situation. The assertion that there is no
equal protection issue in Engquist or in the traffic-officer hypothetical
cannot rest on there being something unique about the substance of the
governmental decision under either set of facts. There must be some
other characteristic common to them that differentiates them
constitutionally from Olech and from a claim of intentional race or sex
discrimination. That differentiating characteristic evidently lies in
another aspect of governmental decisionmaking as the majority
understands it, although the opinion of the Court is not wholly explicit.
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly characterizes decisions such as those
of Engquist’s superiors and of his hypothetical traffic officer as
“subjective” and “discretionary.”201 “There are,” he remarks, “some
forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized
assessments.”202 Where a decision “rest[s] on a wide array of factors that
are difficult to articulate and quantify,”203 Roberts adds that “treating
like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion
granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion
that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.”204 Discretionary
decisions of this kind differ entirely from governmental decisions that
officials make in the presence of “a clear standard against which
departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed.”205
Where the plaintiff claims that “the arbitrary singling out of a
particular person”206 was based on race or sex, the reason that a
constitutional challenge lies is because there is a clear standard
applicable in that situation: except in extraordinary circumstances,
government is not to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Public
action, in short, can be discretionary, or it can be governed by rules. If it
is the latter, equal protection requires, at the least, a rational basis for
treating one person different than others, but if the action is
201. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–05. The Chief Justice also frequently describes them as
“individualized,” but that seems to be a misstep in light of the individual nature of the equal
protection right.
202. Id. at 603.
203. Id. at 604.
204. Id. at 603.
205. Id. at 602.
206. Id. at 603.
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discretionary, it is a matter of constitutional insignificance that the
individual was singled out in a “seemingly arbitrary or irrational
manner”207 or “for no discernible or articulable reason.”208 There is a
domain of rule-governed official behavior and a domain where, as far as
the Constitution is concerned, officials may do as they will.
We can now see why Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Engquist
had not stated an equal protection claim, in contrast to the plaintiff in
Olech. Engquist’s class-of-one claim assailed a public decision within
the realm of discretion and politics, and that realm lies by definition
outside the orderly legal domain governed by equal protection. As noted
earlier, in any given case it might be as difficult to prove that a public
employee was fired or a driver ticketed on the basis of race or sex as it
would be to prove the discriminatory treatment had no basis or was
motivated by individual animus. Ferreting out bad motives is a tricky
business, and we can grant, for the sake of argument, the Chief Justice’s
claim that a well-motivated official might find it difficult to articulate
just why he fired or ticketed X rather than Y.209
But such difficulties do not exist when the question is whether the
official acted intentionally on the basis of race or sex, or because he
personally disliked his victim, or for no reason at all—and regardless of
which of these it is.210 Such reasons are not among Chief Justice
Roberts’s “vast array of subjective, individualized assessments” that we
ordinarily think officials are “entrusted” to make and act upon.211 The
official will know the truth of the matter whether any of them explain his
action. He will know, to put it another way, if he acted in constitutional
bad faith, on the basis of considerations that the Court has defined as
illegitimate, which is true not just of race and sex but of malice and
meaninglessness as well. It follows that if the constitutional norm that
“people should be ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions’ is not violated”212 when an official exercises his discretion
regardless of whether he does so for a “good reason, bad reason, or no

207. Id. at 605.
208. Id. at 604.
209. The Engquist opinion seems to make more of the difficulty of explaining personnel
decisions than is entirely plausible, particularly given the enormous amount of time and energy
American public and private institutions expend attempting to regularize and explain such decisions.
210. The question of officials’ unconscious motivations, while extremely interesting, is not
generally relevant under existing constitutional law.
211. See id. at 603.
212. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1887)).

04 - Powell Final DTP (SDT).docx (Do Not Delete)

5/21/2011 7:38 PM

272

[Vol. 86:217

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

reason at all,”213 the only explanation can be that the norm is, from the
official’s perspective, entirely external to his own thinking, not a basis
on which he has a duty to guide his exercise of discretion. His liability to
judicial correction if he acts on the basis of race or sex only confirms
this: in those circumstances there is an external rule, externally enforced,
that sets an outer bound to his domain of discretion. Within that domain,
equal protection is silent. The Constitution’s apparent purpose of
securing equal protection to all persons is as irrelevant to official
discretion in such circumstances as the Internal Revenue Code’s purpose
of securing revenue is to taxpayers who do not engage in tax evasion.
Taxpayers have no duty of good faith to maximize the government’s
goals, and political officials, after Engquist, apparently have no duty of
good faith to make discretionary decisions conform to the Constitution’s
goals.
We have seen this line of reasoning before: Engquist’s account of
discretion is isomorphic with footnote 27’s understanding of politics. It
is easy to understand why Justice Scalia would join the opinion in
Engquist and, even more to the point for present purposes, why he would
cite it in Heller.214 The distinction Chief Justice Roberts draws there
between official conduct that is subject to rules and public actions that
are entirely a matter of the official’s will is central to Justice Scalia’s
own jurisprudential thought.215 To be sure, the footnote’s “[s]ee, e.g.,”
citation to Engquist, given in support of a statement about how “we have
used” rational-basis scrutiny, glosses over the novelty of Engquist’s
reasoning, and the extent to which Justice Scalia’s views are a
213. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 27, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (No. 07-474)).
214. Footnote 27 provides a pinpoint citation to the section of the Engquist opinion that includes
the traffic-officer hypothetical. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citing
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04). There can be no real doubt that Justice Scalia intends the footnote to
endorse the concept of constitutional irrationality that Engquist presents.
215. Justice Scalia has sometimes expressed his jurisprudential preference for hard-edged rules as
itself a strategic one, intended to restrain what he views as judicial overreaching and thus much like
the New Deal Court’s reason for adopting rational basis. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223–24 (2010) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (explaining the prophylactic and
administrative reasons for adopting a per se fourteen day rule governing when the potentially
coercive effects of custody should be deemed abated); Scalia, supra note 153, at 1179–80 (“[W]hen,
in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say, ‘This is the basis of our
decision,’ I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have
such different facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the
opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing
principle. . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”). If so, there is a serious internal
tension in his thinking on the whole subject, because footnote 27 and other entries in the Scalia
oeuvre seem to reject a strategic approach categorically.
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controversial and contestable position in contemporary legal debate
rather than common wisdom.216 That is, of course, a common rhetorical
strategy in doctrinally novel opinions, and not in constitutional law
alone, but it should not mislead us into missing the radical nature of
what Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts are proposing.
C.

The Understanding of Rationality in Engquist and Footnote 27
Differs Radically from Its Traditional Meaning in Constitutional
Law

The Engquist opinion makes internal sense, but the Chief Justice has
purchased coherence at the cost of moving dramatically away from
traditional constitutional thought. The distinction between rule-governed
and discretionary decisionmaking by the political branches is of course
at least as old as Marbury v. Madison, but its historical role has been to
demarcate those decisions where the courts may properly review the
lawfulness of political action from those in which the law provides no
justiciable standard of review.217 The point of talking about official
discretion has not been that the officials should feel free to act
whimsically, maliciously, or without regard to constitutional norms.218
There is no reason to assume that all exercises of discretion, or even
all those that involve the consideration of factors that are subjective or
difficult to articulate, stand in the same relationship to constitutional
norms: it is difficult to believe that a President making a cabinet
nomination has the same duties under equal protection with respect to
race and sex that Chief Justice Roberts’s traffic officer does in deciding
whom to ticket. Official discretion, furthermore, has traditionally been
understood to heighten, if anything, the official’s duty to act in good
faith. As we have seen, however, Engquist must logically reject the
possibility that there is any duty of good faith that can establish a legal
norm relevant to personnel decisions or traffic citations. If there were,
the distinction Chief Justice Roberts draws between the equal protection
claim at issue in Engquist and the one in Olech (or a race or sex
discrimination claim) would collapse.219
216. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
217. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 367,
373 (1999).
218. Cf. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a clear distinction
between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary decision.”).
219. As I argued earlier, there is no reason that the subjective and hard-to-articulate factors
potentially involved in personnel decisions would make it any more difficult for officials to make
personnel decisions consistently with a constitutional duty of good faith than it is for them to abide
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What is at stake here is the very meaning of rationality—and its
opposite—in constitutional law. Although the Constitution’s text does
not demand, in so many words, that government act rationally, the
dominant assumption has long been that irrational official decisions are
inconsistent with the constitutional norms of due process and equal
protection. Furthermore, both before and after the 1937 shift in
constitutional doctrine, it was clear that the rationality necessary to
affirm the validity of a law or other public action turns on the presence
in official decisions of “‘[independent] considerations in the public
interest,’”220 independent of sheer caprice or the desire to use public
authority to pursue private or malicious ends.221 Before Engquist and
Heller, therefore, constitutional irrationality was a concept
encompassing more than the occasional case of a complete breakdown in
official reasoning.222 The judicial rational-basis test, as the Court has
consistently described it, reflects this underlying view of what the
Constitution demands: the test requires not simply a logical connection
between governmental action and governmental purpose, but the
presence, at least as a matter of hypothesis, of a constitutionally
permissible “legitimate” purpose. A law or other governmental action,
on this view, is irrational for constitutional purposes not only when it is
senseless, but also equally when it fails to meet a legal requirement of
legitimacy in purpose.
This requirement of legitimate purpose is logically independent of the
extraordinarily deferential method by which cases such as Williamson
enforce it. A court following Williamson would likely entertain any
plausible legitimate purpose that will sustain the validity of the official
action, ordinarily without regard to whether the purpose was in fact the
ground for the decision. Unless the exercise is entirely a charade,
however, even a hypothetical inquiry into purpose presupposes the

by the rules regarding race or sex—or any more difficult for courts to measure deviations from the
duty.
220. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (alteration in original)
(quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)).
221. See, e.g., Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring)
(“[U]nequal treatment due solely to animus is a subset of irrational and arbitrary conduct.”).
222. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (applying
rule that equal protection requires that “‘the selection or classification is neither capricious nor
arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy’” (quoting BrownForman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1919)); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 16 (1992)
(explaining that “Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible
inference that the reason for the unequal [governmental] practice was to achieve the benefits of” a
rational governmental policy).
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normative requirement that government act for some legitimate
reason.223 The admittedly rare cases in which a public action is held
invalid because it actually was senseless or solely motivated by an
impermissible purpose show as much.224 The Court’s employment of
rational-basis scrutiny, before footnote 27 and Engquist, was
confirmation that the Constitution demands of public decisions not
merely logic but, equally, respect for an understanding (no doubt largely
implicit) about what is legitimate and illegitimate to do in the exercise of
official power. The baseline of the American constitutional order is a
government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has
reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant
that government’s actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons
that are generally seen to be appropriate.225
Footnote 27 and Engquist rest on a very different understanding of
constitutional rationality. Engquist flatly denies that legitimacy in
purpose or even any purpose at all is constitutionally required when the
official action involves a discretionary decision of the sort Engquist
classed as “subjective.” By citing Engquist to exemplify what the
Constitution means by “irrational laws,” footnote 27 implies that
Engquist’s reasoning is generalizable beyond the specifics of
government employment. More particularly, in light of Engquist’s
unavoidable rejection of a general duty to act in good faith for legitimate
(or at least not for illegitimate) purposes, footnote 27’s invocation of
Engquist suggests that there is no normative element to rationality.
Generally, rationality and legitimacy have no necessary or essential
223. As we have seen, the Court has traditionally viewed Williamson’s indulgence in
hypothesizing a form of deference to a legislature or other decisionmaker, see Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); Part IV.C, that itself is supposed to have determined, nonhypothetically, that there are “[independent considerations] in the public interest” that support the
decision. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno, 345 F. Supp. at 314
n.11).
224. The Court described one of those cases as “[a]pplying the basic principles of rationality
review” to invalidate a city ordinance because “the city’s purported justifications for the ordinance
made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.”
Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001) (discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–450 (1985)).
225. Cf. Duperrault, 367 F.3d at 710 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner explained that equal
protection is violated if an official engages in discrimination for “‘reasons of a personal nature
unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position,’” id. (quoting Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209
F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000)), and that these reasons “go beyond personal hostility to the
plaintiff (i.e., animus) . . . [and] larceny, . . . or a desire to find a scapegoat in order to avoid adverse
publicity and the threat of a lawsuit . . . —improper motives for a public official (scapegoating is not
a legitimate tactic of public officials any more than stealing is), but different from personal
hostility.” Id. (citations omitted).
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relationship in constitutional law. The irrational, as far as the
Constitution is concerned, is that which makes no sense at all, and the
Constitution permits governmental authority to be structured, at least
much of the time, so as to license official actions undertaken for no
reason or bad ones. There are, to be sure, constitutional rules forbidding
certain specific governmental purposes but no general norm that
government must have good reasons for acting.
In one sense, Justice Scalia in footnote 27 and the Engquist Court
agree with the great legal realist Felix Cohen, who wrote long ago that
the rational-basis test “makes of our courts lunacy commissions sitting in
judgment upon the mental capacity of legislators and, occasionally, of
judicial brethren,”226 but Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts do not
think this is a mistake due to the dominance of an arid legal
conceptualism—”transcendental nonsense”—as Cohen saw it. The
courts are lunacy commissions in rational-basis cases, Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Roberts imply, because lunacy is all that the underlying
constitutional command prohibits. Even that prohibition, trivial as it
surely is, has no application when the government is exercising what the
Engquist Court calls “discretion,” for decisions that can be made for any
reason or none cannot rightly be said to be crazy (or rational, for that
matter); the very concept of rationality has no application.227 Perhaps
there are other, non-constitutional modes of evaluation that can be
applied in such circumstances, but the constitutional baseline makes no
necessary demands that government follow either logic or legitimacy
except insofar as it is subject to the external compulsion of judicial
review. The irrational is, as a constitutional matter, perfectly thinkable.
VII. FOOTNOTE 27 REWORKS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT
U.S. Supreme Court Justices and scholars interested in the Court talk
endlessly about the relationship between constitutional law and politics.
The Justices accuse one another of making political rather than properly
legal decisions; some of the scholars attempt to prove that in fact all the
226. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 819 (1935).
227. Recall that the conclusion in Engquist—never put so bluntly—was that Engquist’s superiors
had not violated the Constitution regardless of what senseless or malicious factors led to her
selection for discharge. See 553 U.S. at 595–96 (discussing Engquist’s claim, accepted by the jury,
was that she was discharged for “arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 606 (explaining that the Constitution does not prohibit government from
“treat[ing] an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all”).
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Justices play politics while others provide theories about how the Court
can avoid politics and stick to law. Footnote 27, like any other serious
assertion about constitutional law, has a location amid these debates.228
Justice Scalia, as both a scholar and a judge, subscribes unequivocally
to the proposition that the Court ought to steer clear of politics229—but
then no Justice ever says the reverse. More interestingly, he believes that
law and politics can be distinguished quite clearly, and that it is only
willfulness or (self-)obfuscation that leads anyone to pretend
otherwise.230 The Justices, he argues, can and ought to be “doing
essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our
society’s traditional understanding of that text,” and lawyers’ work, as
he sees it, is an intellectual process of dealing with rules external to the
lawyer’s own reason and judgment: “Texts and traditions are facts to
study.”231 Law is a matter of the reasoned explication and
implementation of values, to be sure,232 but they are values that others
than the lawyer-as-judge dictate. Normative judgments about what
values govern in the public sphere can only be the product of choice and
will, not of reasoning in common, and as such they lie by definition
beyond the competence of the lawyer-as-judge in a democracy.233
“Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not dictated”234 and
228. One can locate the footnote, and Justice Scalia’s views as a whole, in other debates as well.
Jurisprudentially, for example, Scalia’s textualist approach to constitutional and statutory
interpretation is usually seen as a form of legal positivism and/or formalism. See, e.g., Brian Leiter,
Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1150 (1999) (distinguishing Justice
Scalia’s formalism from legal positivism); George Kannar, Comment, The Constitutional Catechism
of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307 (1990) (classing Justice Scalia as both a positivist and a
formalist).
229. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603–04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing actions that are “within the range of traditional democratic action” as “judgments are
to be made by the people” rather than the Court); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CIN. L.REV. 849, 863 (1989) (endorsing originalism in constitutional law because it alleviates the
problem a judge will have distinguishing “those political values that he personally thinks most
important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society’”); Antonin Scalia, A
Tribute to Chief Judge Richard Arnold, 58 ARK. L. REV. 541, 542 (2005) (praising Judge Arnold for
Arnold’s rejection of the view that “‘judges are just politicians in another guise’”).
230. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court does not wish to be fettered by any such limitations on
its preferences.”); id. at 1000–01.
231. Id. at 1000.
232. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[L]aw
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”).
233. Justice Scalia’s trademark opposition to the judicial use of legislative history, a matter on
which I believe that he is largely correct, is also rooted in part in his conviction that value judgments
are not, in the end, amenable to reasoned debate.
234. Casey, 503 U.S. at 1001.
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therefore it is in politics that the function of “making value judgments”
must rest.235 That is true if one understands democracy to entail the
principle that anything requiring a normative judgment “should be voted
on”236 because such decisions can never be determined by “reasoned
judgment,” but must always be choices that express “only personal
predilection.”237 Footnote 27 embodies that understanding: the idea that
men and women can reason in secular society about the normative is for
Justice Scalia a pernicious fantasy.
In the world of footnote 27, constitutional law ratifies this
subordination of legal reason to political will. Constitutional review by
the courts is limited to the enforcement of specific constitutional value
judgments, which are themselves the product of political choice by the
people (the highest political decisionmaker). Beyond the scope of
whatever clear rules the people have chosen to mandate, public decisions
are simply public choices, and the Court should not pretend otherwise,
or suggest the existence of constitutional obligations that cannot be
reduced to such rules.238 For Justice Scalia, the idea that the Constitution
requires public decisions to be rational (or reasonable) in the traditional
sense, involving as it does judgments about the legitimate ends of public
action, makes no sense. Footnote 27 accordingly rejects the traditional
understanding of rational-basis scrutiny, but its full implications go
much further. Rationality as a normative requirement has been a feature
of American constitutional law from the beginning, in large measure
because the early Republic created constitutional law in the image, and
using the tools, of the common law. The Court’s self-conscious creation
and application of doctrine reflects constitutional law’s inheritance of
the common law’s robust confidence in the meaningfulness of reasoned
legal debate over normative issues. Because Justice Scalia believes that
confidence is misplaced, he unsurprisingly rejects, at least in principle,
much of the common law structure of constitutional law as a whole.

235. Id. at 1000.
236. Id. at 1001.
237. Id. at 984. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863
(1989) (“[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in
judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the
law.”).
238. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(“[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by rule” whereas “[l]aws promulgated by the
Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc . . . .” (emphasis in original)); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court) (“[A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no
rule of law at all.”).
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Justice Scalia is, of course, only one person on the nine-member
Court. But there are good reasons to think that in footnote 27 he has
given us an important clue to the future direction of the Roberts Court as
an institution. Justice Scalia’s energy and his strong convictions about
constitutional theory have long made him one of the intellectual driving
forces on the Court: a recent biography observed that “Scalia might be at
the apex of his influence[, w]ith conservatives holding the balance of
power, and still being among the younger members of the nine . . . .”239
Footnote 27 cited, and on examination is of a piece with, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion in the little-remarked Engquist decision, suggesting a
deep congruity between Justice Scalia’s views and Chief Justice
Roberts’. Roberts is a notoriously skillful Chief Justice,240 and Justice
Holmes pointed out long ago that it is “little decisions which the
common run of selectors would pass by” that often “have in them the
germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial
change in the very tissue of the law.”241 Justice Scalia’s footnote and
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion contain between them just such a wider
theory, and that theory seems reflected once again in the exchange
between Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald, where Alito denied and
Breyer embraced a broader normative role for judges in constitutional
decisions.242 Nor was McDonald the only indication from the Court’s
October Term 2009 that the footnote 27 understanding of constitutional
irrationality commands the allegiance of at least a plurality of the
Justices.243 Should a majority of Justices adopt this view, that would
indeed work a profound change in the tissue of constitutional law.

239. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 364 (2009).
240. See Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at
18 (“Chief Justice Roberts is certainly widely viewed as a canny tactician.”).
241. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall (Feb. 4, 1901), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 500, 501 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
242. See supra Part I.
243. See the debate between Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2604–08, 2613–18 (2010). Justice
Kennedy argued that the Court should not reach the question whether a judicial decision can effect a
taking of property within the meaning of the takings clause, in part because substantive due process
principles already render invalid judicial decisions that are “‘arbitrary or irrational.’” Id. at 2615
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)).
Justice Kennedy took this concept to include considerations of the “‘legitimacy’ of . . . the court’s
judgment” and its effect on the reasonable expectations of the property-holder. Id. at 2614 (quoting
E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998)). Justice Scalia responded that this understanding of
substantive due process is “such a wonderfully malleable concept” that “even a firm commitment to
apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular.” Id. at 2608.
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CONCLUSION
Footnote 27 in District of Columbia v. Heller opens a window onto a
brave new world of constitutional realism in which it is irrationality
rather than reason that lies at the heart of our constitutional order. In that
world there are constitutional rules, and where they apply, judges can
enforce them even as to political actors. And there is the exercise of
discretionary political power, with which judges cannot meddle in the
Constitution’s name even if the power is exercised in ways that
contravene the Constitution’s norms. Mystifications—transcendental
nonsense—such as reasoned judgment and good faith are to be swept
aside. The footnote’s world is brilliantly lit, with razor-sharp edges
between light and darkness, sense and nonsense. It is also a cold world,
and (for this author at any rate) a little frightening.

